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ENTERPRISE WITHOUT ENTITIES
Andrew Verstein*
Scholars and practicing lawyers alike consider legal entities to be essential.
Who can imagine running a large business without using a business organiza-
tion, such as a corporation or partnership? This Article challenges conven-
tional wisdom by showing that vast enterprises—with millions of customers
paying trillions of dollars—often operate without any meaningful use of
entities.
This Article introduces the reciprocal exchange, a type of insurance company
that operates without any meaningful use of a legal entity. Instead of ob-
taining insurance from a common nexus of contract, customers directly insure
one another through a dense web of bilateral agreements. While often over-
looked or conflated with mutual insurance companies, reciprocal exchanges
include some of America’s largest and best-known insurance enterprises.
This Article explores how it is possible to run an international conglomerate
with essentially no recourse to organizational law as it is normally conceived,
and it then draws out the important implications of these findings. The viabil-
ity of reciprocal exchanges stands as a powerful foil to the academic consensus
that legal entities are somehow essential, while nevertheless validating the un-
derlying logic that led scholars to elevate entities in the first place.
Table of Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
I. The Essential Role of Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
A. Transaction Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
1. Contracting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
2. Opportunism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
B. Limited Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
C. Entity Shielding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
1. Liquidation Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
2. Priority of Claims. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
II. The Reciprocal Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
* Associate Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law; Visiting Associate
Professor and Charles J. Merriam Scholar, University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful to 
Michael Aylward, Miriam Baer, Jonathan Barnett, Steven Bainbridge, Margaret Blaire, Ofer 
Eldar, Ezra Friedman, Victor Goldberg, William Klein, Lynn LoPucki, Omri Marian, Patricia 
McCoy, Peter Molk, John Rappaport, Eric Rasmussen, Gabriel Rauterberg, Mark Roe, Daniel 
Schwarcz, Sid Shapiro, Richard Squire, Rick Swedloff, Mark Ira Weinstein, and the participants 
at the 2017 Spring Fordham Faculty Workshop Series, the 2017 Fall University of 
Chicago Works in Progress Series, the American Law and Economics Association 2016 
Annual Meeting, the Insurance Section of the American Association of Law Schools 2016 
Annual Meeting, and the 2016 Liberty Mutual New Scholars Workshop on Insurance 
Law and Risk at Boston College. Librarian Sally Irvin and students Daniel Jouppi and John 
Sanders helped greatly with research.
247
248 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 116:247
A. Basic Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
B. History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
C. Entities: Absent or Incidental . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
III. Enterprise Through Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
A. Transaction Costs: Agent as Nexus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
B. Limited Liability: Constructive Notice When It Matters . . . . . 277
1. Operating Without Limited Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
2. Obtaining Limited Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
C. Entity Shielding: Lock In and Priority by Other Means . . . . . 281
1. Liquidation Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
2. Priority of Claims. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
IV. Questioning the Essentiality of Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290
A. Functional Essentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290
1. The Scale of Functional Contribution of Entities . . . . . 291
2. Removing Entities to Accommodate Values: Health
Care Sharing Ministries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
3. Removing Entities to Reduce Risk:
Person-to-Person Lending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
B. Ontological Essentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
C. Normative Essentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
Introduction
Scholars and practitioners generally agree that any large enterprise must
be run through a legal entity such as a corporation. While a minority view
questions whether business entities are really necessary,1 the leading aca-
demic voices argue that use of a legal entity confers benefits that would be
“effectively impossible” to obtain through other means.2 For example, an
entity reduces the transaction costs of coordinating an enterprise’s many
1. Business is conducted by human beings—workers, customers, suppliers—who can
coordinate through contracts. So what is gained by positing a fictional person? The triviality of
entities is emphasized in the main line of law-and-economics scholarship and, in particular,
the contract theory of the firm. E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The
Economic Structure of Corporate Law 24–25 (1991); Richard A. Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law 396 (4th ed. 1992). The essentiality of entities is also intimately related to the
question of whether organizational law (such as corporate law) is trivial in the sense of con-
taining no important mandatory rules. See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Polit-
ical and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 542 (1990). If entities are not themselves vital,
and so it is feasible to do without them, then even mandatory rules on entities are trivial. On
the nexus of contract theory of the firm, see Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production,
Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777 (1972), and Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976). See also William T. Allen, Contracts and
Communities in Corporation Law, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1395, 1400 (1993) (“The notion
that corporations are ‘persons’ is seen as a weak and unimportant fiction.”).
2. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110
Yale L.J. 387, 406 (2000).
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patrons,3 limits liability for shareholders,4 and protects a business from un-
timely dissolution.5 The widespread consensus is that legal entities are essen-
tial to economic life as we know it.
This Article challenges the regnant view by documenting and analyzing
a domain of mass commerce in which legal entities are substantially absent.
In this domain, millions of people exchange trillions of dollars, and they do
so without meaningful recourse to legal entities.6 That domain is insurance,
as conducted by reciprocal exchanges.
A “reciprocal exchange” is an insurance enterprise in which all insur-
ance subscribers contract directly with one another, promising to pay a
share of any losses the others suffer. A thick braid of contracts unites a circle
of natural persons, each of whom participates as part of the enterprise, with
no legal entity at the contractual core.
The theoretical significance of reciprocals has gone unnoticed because
reciprocals themselves have gone unnoticed. Most scholars and insurance
practitioners appear to be unaware that reciprocals exist,7 and some even
deem them to be impossible.8 Yet reciprocals provide almost 10% of
America’s property and casualty insurance,9 which totals to about 5% of all
3. See, e.g., Martin Hellwig, Banks, Markets, and the Allocation of Risks in an Economy,
154 J. Inst. & Theoretical Econ. 328, 331 (1998). A related thought is that entities reduce
the potential for exploitation when some or many contracts must be left incomplete.
4. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. Corp. L. 479 (2001); Scott
Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Economics of Limited Liability: An Empirical Study of New
York Law Firms, 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 107; The Key to Industrial Capitalism: Limited Liability,
Economist (Dec. 23, 1999), http://www.economist.com/node/347323 [https://perma.cc/
Z3EB-LLZE].
5. See generally Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 434–35.
6. Three large reciprocals alone insure some thirty million individuals. See Corporate
Overview: Financial Strength, USAA, https://www.usaa.com/inet/pages/about_usaa_corporate_
overview_financial_strength [https://perma.cc/ST9M-5XED] (11.4 million members); About
Farmers, Farmers Ins., https://www.farmers.com/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/U9GT-CDAC]
(nineteen million policies); Jim Martin, Erie Insurances Marks 90 Years, GoErie (Apr. 12, 2015,
12:01 AM), http://www.goerie.com/news/20150412/erie-insurance-marks-90-years [https://per
ma.cc/FCA3-5P2M] (five million policy holders).
7. Essentially the only research on reciprocal exchanges took place in the 1960s. Richard
Norgaard, a longtime professor at the University of Connecticut, devoted his PhD dissertation
and several articles to documenting the history and contemporary practices of reciprocals in
the United States. Richard Lima Norgaard, Reciprocals: A Study of the Evolution of an Insur-
ance Institution (1962) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota). Dennis
Reinmuth followed with a book focused on the law and public policy of reciprocal insurance.
Dennis F. Reinmuth, Regulation of Reciprocal Insurance Exchanges (1967); see also
Michael A. Haskel, The Legal Relationship Among a Reciprocal Insurer’s Subscribers, Advisory
Committee and Attorney-in-Fact, 6 N.Y. City L. Rev. 35 (2003).
8. See Hellwig, supra note 3, at 331 (calling the very notion of such a structure “a bit
ludicrous”).
9. See Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, 2013 Market Share Reports for Property/
Casualty Groups and Companies 11–12 (2014), http://www.naic.org/prod_serv/MSR-PB-
14.pdf [https://perma.cc/9DY8-KSSC]. P&C insurance includes lines such as personal-auto-
mobile and home insurance, as well as flood and fire, and other business insurance.
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the nation’s insurance.10 Almost one in six doctors buy malpractice insur-
ance from a reciprocal.11 Moreover, some of America’s best-known insur-
ance enterprises are reciprocal exchanges. For example, USAA and Farmers
Insurance, both among the ten largest insurers in the United States,12 are
reciprocals.13 Reciprocals are too important to ignore.
If reciprocals are forgotten, it may be because they are often confused
with mutual insurance companies, or “mutuals.”14 Although both enterprise
forms emphasize cooperation among customers, they nevertheless differ in
important ways. They are subject to different governing statutory provi-
sions.15 Reciprocals present different risks of managerial expropriation be-
cause their compensation structures sometimes permit managers to extract
substantial profits from the enterprise.16 They raise different tensions be-
tween present and future policyholders; in a reciprocal, the present policy-
holders are due a refund if the reciprocal pays out less than the premiums
collected, whereas mutual policyholders may have no direct claim to such a
surplus—and will never enjoy its fruit if they cancel their policy before the
mutual opts to pay a dividend. Such structural differences lead to meaning-
ful economic differences.17
Most crucially for present purposes, mutuals and reciprocals also differ
in their use of legal entities. Like almost all business ventures, a mutual relies
on a legal entity, often a corporation, to operate; a mutual is peculiar only in
that the legal entity happens to be owned by its policyholders. Conversely,
the reciprocal exchange is neither owned by policyholders nor anyone else,
10. The property and casualty market is about half of the total insurance market. Indus-
try Overview: Insurance Industry at a Glance, Ins. Info. Inst., http://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/
industry-overview [https://perma.cc/2GBF-RGWR]. Reciprocals are prohibited from offering
life insurance. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
11. See Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, supra note 9, at 185–86.
12. Top 25 Insurance Companies, Insweb, http://www.insweb.com/insurance-tools/insur
ance-companies.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20160320080747/http://www.insweb.com/
insurance-tools/insurance-companies.html].
13. True v. Robles, 571 F.3d 412, 413 (5th Cir. 2009) (stating that USAA is a reciprocal
exchange); About Farmers, supra note 6 (stating that Farmers is a reciprocal exchange).
14. E.g., William M. Duffy, The Ultra Vires Question as Applied to Corporation Subscribers
at Reciprocal or Inter-Insurance Exchanges, 5 Ky. L.J. 52, 52 (1917) (defining reciprocal as “an
unincorporated mutual”); Peter Molk, The Puzzling Lack of Cooperatives, 88 Tul. L. Rev. 899,
921 (2014) (mistakenly calling USAA a mutual).
15. See, e.g., Tex. Ins. Code Ann. § 942.003 (West 2009) (exempting reciprocal ex-
changes from otherwise applicable insurance regulations); id. § 942 (imposing new obligations
on reciprocals); id. §§ 882–883 (regulating mutuals).
16. While managers of a mutual may help themselves to perquisites or slacken their ef-
forts, they cannot simply extract a slice of the premiums; this is part of the appeal of the
mutual structure, which ensures a reasonable relationship between the cost of the insurance
and the protection provided. The compensation structure of some reciprocals permits manag-
ers to extract substantial profits from the enterprise. See infra Section II.A.
17. Emilio C. Venezian, Reciprocal Insurance: A Case of Supply Created by Demand, 6 J.
Risk Fin. 404, 412–13 (2005) (showing greater reciprocal insurance levels than mutual or
stock insurance, even in the presence of management fees).
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since there is no legal entity to own.18 Its members stand in direct contrac-
tual privity.
The viability of reciprocal insurance challenges the entity essentialism
now dominant in the corporate law community and elsewhere. Without any
entity, reciprocals have somehow been able to secure or foreswear the sup-
posedly essential functions that entities provide. It turns out that creative
applications of contract law, agency law, and insurance law suffice to sup-
port broad coordination. How? An enterprise’s many patrons can appoint a
common person (the “attorney-in-fact”) to act as their agent, authorized to
quickly sign multifarious contracts in their names.19 Liability can be limited
and prioritized within those contracts.20 These limitations are binding on
third parties because insurance regulation puts potential creditors on con-
structive notice of these agreements. 21 Entity-like functions follow, but sans
entity.
This Article therefore deflates the importance of entities, but it does not
necessarily undermine all arguments of entity theorists. To the contrary, the
fact that reciprocals seek and find many of the core functions provided by
entities underscores the importance of those functions. Reciprocals have
used agency law to overcome transaction costs, and they have alloyed con-
tract law and insurance regulation to create the pattern of creditors’ rights
that scholars refer to as “asset partitioning.”22 Though reciprocals do this
without the state’s helpful entities, public law is still important for establish-
ing some of those entity-like benefits because insurance regulation gives the
gift of constructive notice.23 Entity essentialism is therefore honored in the
breach. Entity theorists overstate the uniqueness of entities in achieving cer-
tain functions, but they are largely correct in highlighting those functions.
Indeed, even as reciprocals achieve those functions without entities,
their circumnavigation traces the path of organizational law. Contractual
limitations on liability or liquidation are usually binding only on those who
have notice of them.24 Organizational law avoids this problem by conjuring
fictional persons entities. The reciprocal instead relies on insurance and
agency law to construct fictional networks and fictional notice. Thus, recipro-
cals swap one set of legal fictions for another in the quest for certain key
economic functions.
18. See, e.g., General Revenue Revision: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means,
85th Cong. 3342 (1958) (statement of Floyd E. Jacobs, General Counsel, American Reciprocal
Insurance Association) (“Again, we reiterate, that the so-called exchange is a mere place at
which the subscriber-policyholders exchange contracts of indemnity among themselves. Such
exchange owns nothing and is legally, of course, incapable of owning anything, since it is not
an entity.”).
19. See infra Section III.A.
20. See infra Section III.C.
21. See infra Section III.B.
22. See infra Sections I.B, I.C; see also infra Section III.A.
23. See infra Section III.A.
24. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 420–22.
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This Article gives reciprocals their first serious scholarly treatment, ex-
plains how they succeed without entities, and relates these findings to the
most foundational questions in business law.25 For example, the case for
robust corporate social responsibility and corporate regulation rests most
comfortably if entities are essential.26 If the state grants irreplaceable benefits
only through entities, then it may reasonably charge a quid pro quo, such as
meaningful philanthropy or empowerment of workers.27 This sort of “con-
cession theory” argument is weakened if entities are just one path to
enterprise.
The essentialism debate is not just a normative one, about what we
should do in regards to the regulation of enterprise. It is equally a question
of what we can hope for. 28 Entity essentialism is a crucial obstacle to unor-
thodox visions of commerce.29 According to some techno-optimists, com-
mercial life is bound to change radically in coming years. A series of terms
(person-to-person, the sharing economy, gig-economy, micro-work, dis-
intermediation, decentralization) suggest a world without traditional compa-
nies, hierarchies, or employment contracts.30 In recent years, platforms have
emerged to more directly link borrowers and lenders,31 buyers and sellers,32
25. For another example, entity triviality plays an important role in arguing against
mandatory rules in corporate law. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Foreword, The Debate
on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1395 (1989).
26. Cf. Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory,
88 W. Va. L. Rev. 173 (1985) (describing the relationship between certain theories of corpo-
rate existence and the appropriateness of regulation).
27. E.g., Kent Greenfield, The Failure of Corporate Law 35 (2006) (“Early in our
nation’s history, a corporation was seen as a creation of the state rather than a product of
private contract, and a corporate charter came with important conditions that protected the
public interest. In exchange for receiving the special benefits of incorporation, including lim-
ited liability for shareholders, corporations were chartered for some public purpose.”). Con-
versely, if entities are trivial, then entities do little more for parties than they could do through
contract alone. In that case, corporate regulation is perhaps only as legitimate as regulation of
private contracts. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Rise of the Uncorporation 2 (2009). We do
regulate private contracts, but prudential and libertarian concerns make us reluctant to do so.
See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts . . . .”).
28. Cf. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason 677 (Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood
eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1781) (asserting that all of philosophy amounts to answer-
ing three questions: “What can I know? What should I do? What can I hope for?”).
29. Of course, this contemporary debate was foreshadowed by questions we associate
with R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937), inquiring into why we
observe firms at all, given the availability of contracting in the market.
30. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Rules for a Flat World: Why Humans Invented
Law and How to Reinvent it for a Complex Global Economy (2016).
31. LendingClub and Prosper both provide this service, which is sometimes called “P2P
lending.” See generally Andrew Verstein, The Misregulation of Person-to-Person Lending, 45
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 445 (2011).
32. eBay and Craigslist both provide this service.
November 2017] Enterprise Without Entities 253
riders and drivers,33 and renters and letters.34 Business futurists emphasize
technology as a liberator,35 but the transformation can never be totally suc-
cessful if entities are in fact essential.36 By contrast, if entities are optional,
then we are free to ask how technology might facilitate new models of com-
mercial connection. And this, paradoxically, might bring benefits most
quickly to those least enamored of modern commercial life, such as religious
objectors to health insurance and those cynical about the contemporary
banking system.37 This Article will explore what reciprocals can teach us
about life without entities and consider how removing entities might sup-
port health insurance and person-to-person lending.
Perhaps most provocatively, by positing that reciprocals are not entities,
this Article questions what it means to be an “entity” and what role the
concept plays in our legal system. Even if entities are not functionally neces-
sary, might they be ontologically necessary? That is, are there reasons that
we must talk in terms of entities (rather than just humans, tasks, and deals,
for example), in the context of reciprocals or elsewhere?
The structure for this Article is as follows. Part I introduces theories
about the status of entities in our society—are they trivial or essential, and
why? Part II introduces reciprocal exchanges and discusses the ways in which
they do and do not use legal entities. Part III synthesizes the major theoreti-
cal premises from the first part with the minor factual premises from the
second part. The goal is to understand how reciprocals are able to function
without meaningful use of entities. Alongside this is the converse question:
Why aren’t reciprocals even more common than they are currently? Part IV
then asks what this study of reciprocals may have to say about the essential-
ity of entities in general. Specifically, it explores the magnitude of entities’
functional contribution, their ontological priority, and their normative
significance.
I. The Essential Role of Entities
Life is possible without legal entities. After all, there have been historical
epochs when workable legal entities were largely unavailable.38 In the pre-
sent, unincorporated associations still do plenty of things in our world, like
33. Lyft and Uber both provide this service, which is sometimes called “ridesharing.”
34. Airbnb and VRBO both provide this service.
35. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 Yale L.J. 1, 64 (1996) (arguing that
“given the computerization of contracting and recordkeeping, [the assumption that large firms
would continue to exist] may be unwarranted”).
36. This Article is about the potential for commerce with people and without entities,
but the inverse—commerce with entities and without people—is explored by others. See, e.g.,
Shawn Bayern, The Implications of Modern Business-Entity Law for the Regulation of Autono-
mous Systems, 19 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 93 (2015).
37. See infra Section IV.A.2.
38. Cf. infra note 60.
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run little-league teams.39 Some industries are able to coordinate many indi-
viduals through trust and contract.40 And everyone recognizes that natural
persons can do a lot of business using only property, contract, and agency
law—just ask one of America’s twenty-three million sole proprietors.41 So
life without entities has always been imaginable.
What has seemed unimaginable to many is commercial life on any ap-
preciable scale without entities. Relatedly, it has seemed inconceivable that
serious ventures would be attempted without a legal entity now that legal
entities are widely available. The triumph of the entity, at least for large
ventures, seems inevitable.
But why is this so? In the end, natural persons must do all the work that
is to be done. They must make plans that are comprehensible, mutually
agreeable, and collectively rational. Why can they not scaffold worthwhile
projects onto a framework of bilateral and multilateral contracts? It is true
that novice entrepreneurs might find it convenient to pattern their affairs
from some off-the-rack defaults,42 just as novice chefs might want a formal
recipe or sample menu.43 But in no case is a formal recipe or menu itself
part of or essential to the meal.
The following Sections outline three of the main contenders for the es-
sential contribution of entities: reduction in transaction costs, limited liabil-
ity for shareholders, and shielding for the company from investors and their
creditors.
A. Transaction Costs
Coordination is costly. Parties must either (1) specify their rights in
clear and credible contracts, which creates a meaningful upfront cost, or (2)
leave many rights unspecified, and thereby tempt costly opportunism or liti-
gation concerning gaps in the contract. 44 Use of a legal entity is thought to
39. See, e.g., King v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 505 F.2d 264, 265 (6th Cir. 1974) (not-
ing that a member of an unincorporated little-league association is suing the incorporated
little league).
40. See William A. Klein & Mitu Gulati, Economic Organization in the Construction In-
dustry: A Case Study of Collaborative Production Under High Uncertainty, 1 Berkeley Bus. L.J.
137 (2004) (explaining how coordination is possible between many patrons of a construction
project). Professors Gilson, Sabel, and Scott deal obliquely with the same notion in other
industries, such as pharmaceutical research. Ronald J. Gilson et al., Braiding: The Interaction of
Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1377
(2010). By emphasizing the power of informal sanctions and information sharing to support
formal contracting, these projects implicitly deemphasize the salient alternative—ownership of
the entire construction or research project by a single firm.
41. Scott A. Hodge, The U.S. Has More Individually Owned Businesses than Corporations,
Tax Found. (Jan. 13, 2014), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/us-has-more-individually-owned-
businesses-corporations [https://perma.cc/W6LF-VVCS].
42. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporation Law and Economics 29 (2002).
43. See Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation
Later, 31 J. Corp. L. 779 (2006) (describing benefits of a corporate governance menu).
44. See Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual
Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1023 (2009).
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reduce both the number of costly contracts and per-contract cost of oppor-
tunism for each individual linkage among business patrons.
1. Contracting
Bilateral agreements must be negotiated, considered, drafted, and some-
times updated. A complex enterprise with many interconnected patrons
would pay such costs many times over. Conversely, the number of contracts
is minimized if each patron need only coordinate with a single party. For
some theorists, legal entities are largely justified by their ability to act as the
common nexus of contract and reduce transaction costs.45
Professor Martin Hellwig articulates this sort of reasoning in an influen-
tial paper about the role of financial intermediaries in the economy. As a
thought experiment, he considers whether we could dispense with insurance
companies if everyone just bought insurance from “the local greengrocer.”46
Naturally enough, Hellwig doubts that such an arrangement could succeed
and argues that the crucial problem “is one involving transaction costs sav-
ings rather than any inherent features of risk management.”47
[T]he mere costs of writing all the requisite contracts would eat up a signif-
icant portion of the funds that the households provide. If there are, say, a
thousand shopkeepers to be financed, the intervention of an intermediary
issuing significantly larger life insurance policies to each of the one million
households and using the proceeds to finance each of the one thousand
shopkeepers would reduce the number of requisite contracts from one billion
(one thousand times one million for each shopkeeper-household pair) to
one million and one thousand (one for each household and one for each
shopkeeper). Even if the costs of writing a single contract are no more than
a few pennies, such a reduction in the number of requisite contracts would
reduce costs significantly . . . .48
The cost of contracting renders any nonentity insurance “a bit ludicrous.”49
While Hellwig is concerned with financial institutions, the same logic
applies to industrial companies. Consider an enterprise with five partici-
pants—a user of ball bearings, an ore miner, a factory worker, a foreman,
45. See Reinier Kraakman et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative
and Functional Approach 5 (3d ed. 2017) (describing a firm “as a ‘nexus for contracts’ in
the sense that a firm serves, fundamentally, as the common counterparty in numerous con-
tracts with suppliers, employees, and customers, coordinating the actions of these multiple
persons through exercise of its contractual rights”); see also supra note 1.
46. Hellwig, supra note 3, at 331.
47. Id. Risk could be managed by splitting the customer’s insurance needs up into man-
ageable slices and then dolling them out to the various grocers. See id.
48. Id. In 1997, 1.74 DM equaled one USD. Harold Marcuse, Historical Dollar-to-Marks
Currency Conversion Page, U.C. Santa Barbara (Aug. 19, 2005) (updated Feb. 9, 2013), http:
//www.history.ucsb.edu/faculty/marcuse/projects/currency.htm [https://perma.cc/TG94-KF
BK]. So 100,000 DM was $57,471.26.
49. Id.
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and a capitalist investor. These natural persons might be able to work to-
gether to their mutual benefit, but it could take a great deal of contracting.
The customer will want to contract with the capitalist to gain possession of
the final products, and the capitalist will want to hire a foreman to hire and
motivate a worker, who will want an ore miner happily churning out inputs.
Figure 1 illustrates these relationships.
Figure 1
Each will soon recognize, however, the utility of having some relation-
ship to the others. The capitalist will not want to be hamstrung if the worker
is unavailable some day and cannot issue orders to the ore miner. If the ball
bearings are sufficiently important to the customer, she may want some con-
tractual rights against the foreman in case the capitalist proves intransigent.
Contractual relationships multiply as the enterprise achieves a more sophis-
ticated contractual expression. Figure 2 depicts the increasingly complex
network of relationships.
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Figure 2
Each arrow is costly, and the costs of contracting multiply with the
number of participants. Five participants generate ten arrows. Six partici-
pants yield fifteen arrows. An enterprise with ten thousand participants gen-
erates nearly fifty million contracts, one for each pair to evaluate and
negotiate.50 Such an arrangement is unsuitable for mass commerce.
The firm, as a common party to all contracts, greatly simplifies the en-
deavor. Figure 3 illustrates how a common party can simplify things.
50. See Project Mgmt. Inst., A Guide to the Project Management Body of
Knowledge 292 (5th ed. 2013).
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Figure 3
If each patron can contract with the firm, then the number of con-
tracting problems never exceeds the number of participants. Each person
must vet, dicker, and sign only one agreement. Scalable ventures become
tractable again. The entity becomes essential as a matter of almost geometric
proof.
2. Opportunism
Still, none of the forgoing contracts is perfect and complete.51 A second
rationale for entities focuses on the potential risks of contractual exploita-
tion.52 The life of a single bilateral contract affords great potential for oppor-
tunism, where one party might exploit the other by either invoking a
needlessly strict contract term or shirk through a mistakenly lax one. These
worries only multiply if a project requires many participants to coordinate,53
since each one might have a chance to exploit the contracts’ weaknesses. 54
51. See Jean Tirole, Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?, 67 Econometrica 741,
771–72 (1999) (explaining the existence of incomplete contracts partially in terms of unfore-
seen contingencies). See generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational
Contracts, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1089, 1090–91 (1981) (discussing incomplete contracts).
52. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of
Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & Econ. 233 (1979).
53. This is the hallmark of team production. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 1, at
779–81.
54. See Andrew Verstein, Ex Tempore Contracting, 55 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1869,
1893–94 (noting that multiparty projects face challenges to amicable coordination).
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The problems inherent in contracting are reduced if a single individual is a
common party to all contracts and reserves the right to update all contracts
in the network.55
Still, why must a legal entity be the common party, rather than a natural
person? There is no answer inherent in a transaction costs view, and so such
views must be supplemented by references to other organizational features.
Some accounts emphasize the eternal life of legal entities, which minimizes
the costly reassembly of the network upon the inevitable death of a human
nexus.56 Another account stresses the structured transferability of firms as
bundles of assets.57
Talk of structured bundles of assets leads naturally to limited share-
holder liability and entity shielding, since all are part of an asset partitioning
view. According to Henry Hansmann and Reiner Kraakman, legal entities
are essential because they allow something important that would be “effec-
tively impossible” without the creation of legal entities: asset partitioning.58
Asset partitioning is composed of limited liability (owner shielding) and en-
tity shielding, which collectively facilitate liquidation protection and priori-
tization of creditor claims.59 According to asset-partitioning theorists, the
55. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 Va. L. Rev. 247, 276–87 (1999); see also Coase, supra note 29, at 390–92. This would
explain the prominence of the corporation, but it would not explain the pervasive use of
limited life entities. Many partnerships and close corporations have liberal dissolution condi-
tions, either by default or contract. Unif. P’ship Act §§ 601, 801 (Nat’l Conference of
Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 1997). Many investment vehicles, such as private equity funds,
require liquidation every five or ten years. Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Does
Private Equity Create Wealth? The Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives on Corporate Govern-
ance, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 219, 222 (2009).
56. E.g., Andrew A. Schwartz, The Perpetual Corporation, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 764,
765–76 (2012).
57. Kenneth Ayotte & Henry Hansmann, Legal Entities as Transferable Bundles of Con-
tracts, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 715, 717–18 (2013) [hereinafter Ayotte & Hansmann, Legal Entities];
see also Kenneth Ayotte & Henry Hansmann, A Nexus of Contracts Theory of Legal Entities, 42
Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 1, 1–2 (2015). If a natural person individually holds all the contractual
relations, she will face difficulty if she wishes to sell her enterprise to someone else. Her ability
to novate the contracts can be limited, explicitly or by default, in order to protect her
counterparties from opportunistic transfer to less desirable contractors. But those limitations
allow her counterparties to ransom their consent even for good faith transfers. Vesting an
alienable entity with all of the rights allows them to be transferred as, and often only as, a
bundle. Such bundling may be more valuable ex ante for all participants. Unlimited transfer of
a bundle removes holdup power from the nontransferor counterparty without allowing the
transferor excessive and exploitative power to transfer to an inappropriate buyer.
58. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 406. For other entity-stressing views, see
Edward M. Iacobucci & George G. Triantis, Economic and Legal Boundaries of Firms, 93 Va. L.
Rev. 515 (2007), which stresses legal decisions, such as capital structure, which must be made
for an entire entity.
59. Although Hansmann and Kraakman consider limited liability to be an important
form of asset partitioning, they are far from its most strident advocates. Instead, they empha-
size entity shielding as the truly essential part of organizational law. See Hansmann & Kraak-
man, supra note 2, at 390.
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utility of the entity lies in the ability to apportion assets into distinct pools
for distinct creditors. Such accounts are explored in the next two Sections.
B. Limited Liability
Limited liability is the common term for the form of asset partitioning
that protects the owners from the debts of the enterprise.60 Limited liability
is the most commonly cited benefit conferred by the use of legal entities.61
Praise for limited liability borders on the breathless.62 The Economist maga-
zine called it “[t]he key to industrial capitalism,” a contribution on par with
developments like the steam engine and the locomotive.63 It has been argued
that unlimited shareholder liability would frighten away small investors and
small investments by large investors, who have little control over the liabili-
ties that might eventually befall them.64
Even beyond the impact on investors, the theory of asset partitioning
stresses the importance of limited liability to creditors.65 With unlimited lia-
bility, creditors would need to assess the solvency of enterprise shareholders
before determining the total pool available to bond the firm’s commitments.
The appropriate interest rate to charge a company would be higher if the
company has mom-and-pop investors than if it is owned by Warren Buffett,
and it is costly to run a credit check on dozens—or millions—of sharehold-
ers. Creditors would also demand restrictions on the free sale of stock, lest
wealthy shareholders sell their shares to less wealthy ones just after the credit
check is over. Limited liability for owners reduces these costs by taking
60. Hansmann and Kraakman refer to it as defensive asset partitioning. Id. at 394. Their
work with Richard Squire endorses the new term “owner shielding.” Henry Hansmann et al.,
Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1335, 1336 (2005).
61. For example, one common version of the concession theory cites limited liability as a
privilege awarded to corporations, for which taxation or corporate social responsibility can be
justly extracted in exchange. See Jill E. Fisch, Frankenstein’s Monster Hits the Campaign Trail:
An Approach to Regulation of Corporate Political Expenditures, 32 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 587,
630 n.227 (1991) (“[T]he artificial entity theory . . . views the corporation as an artificial
creation of the state subject to state-imposed limitations . . . .”).
62. See, e.g., Curtis Gardner, The Advantages of Limited Liability and Company
Formation (1907); Melissa Horton, Investopedia Stock Analysis: What Are the Advantages to
Registering a Limited Liability Company (LLC) in Delaware?, Investopedia (Apr. 29, 2015, 4:11
PM), http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/042915/what-are-advantages-registering-limit
ed-liability-company-llc-delaware.asp [https://perma.cc/J7HZ-SLD5].
63. The Key to Industrial Capitalism: Limited Liability, supra note 4. Stephensen was the
Father of Railways, Plaque Unveiled for ‘Father of Railways’ George Stephenson, BBC News
(Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-leicestershire-35039893 [https://perma.
cc/B76S-7PGX], and Watt was of course famous for making the steam engine viable, C.N.
Trueman, James Watt, Hist. Learning Site (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.historylearningsite.co
.uk/britain-1700-to-1900/industrial-revolution/james-watt/ [https://perma.cc/WB53-HCMX].
64. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for
Corporate Torts, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1203, 1218 (2002).
65. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 390.
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shareholder wealth off the table. Protecting shareholders thus increases li-
quidity, lowers firm creditor monitoring costs, and calms the nerves of risk
averse investors.
C. Entity Shielding
The other side of asset partitioning involves protecting the enterprise’s
assets from the personal creditors of the owners. When entity shielding is
strong, the creditors of Ford Motor Company need not fear that Henry
Ford’s personal bookie will force an untimely liquidation of company assets
to repay Henry’s personal gambling debts. Nor will those personal creditors
stand on equal footing with business creditors upon insolvency. Enterprise
creditors can focus their attention just on the pool of business assets that
have been offered up to secure their contracts. Personal creditors can do no
more than take Henry’s shares in the firm—which does little to frustrate
business creditors. Hansmann, Kraakman, and Squire call this function “en-
tity shielding.”66 Entity shielding operates through two crucial efficiency
channels: liquidation protection and priority of claims.
1. Liquidation Protection
The less common and perhaps less vital prop of entity shielding is called
“liquidation protection,” which refers to the durability of enterprise invest-
ments.67 Many enterprises have going-concern value—their parts are worth
more as a bundle in the long term than the parts can be sold for individually
and on a moment’s notice. For example, a restaurant may be worth more
than the sum value of its spoons and plates if it has loyal customers and a
staff that knows exactly how to keep those customers happy. If sold instantly
and piecemeal, it would be impossible to monetize that idiosyncratic loyalty
and know-how. Likewise, a factory may be sold at a fraction of cost, and a
sliver of future returns, if sold when only half-built or separate from a net-
work of customers and intellectual property. Sudden sales can be forced if
an investor withdraws her money from the venture; most nonentity schemes
of investing include such a default right to withdraw one’s investment
capital.68
66. Hansmann et al., supra note 60, at 1336. Hansmann and Kraakman separately refer
to it as affirmative asset partitioning. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2.
67. Liquidation protection has also been called “strong entity shielding” in order to em-
phasize that liquidation protection tends to occur only in some cases and only where claims
priority—“weak entity shielding”—has been established. Hansmann et al., supra note 60, at
1337–38. Liquidation protection is also related to capital lock in. Margaret M. Blair, Locking in
Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51
UCLA L. Rev. 387, 427–28 (2003). But see Larry E. Ribstein, Should History Lock in Lock-in?,
41 Tulsa L. Rev. 523, 523–26 (2006) (criticizing focus on lock in).
68. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 411–12 (explaining that tenancy in com-
mon gives each party the right to demand partition).
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Given the harsh effects of hasty withdrawal of capital, it is reasonable for
entrepreneurs to seek restrictions on investor withdrawal, and some restric-
tions are legally permissible. For example, coinvestors may contractually
waive their right to partition the investment or withdraw from the enter-
prise; the law will respect such agreements among partners or tenants in
common, at least over a reasonable duration.69 Such agreements, however,
are usually personal to the signatories and not binding on their personal
creditors, who, upon default, come to stand in their shoes.70 This loophole
and others make it very difficult to lock capital into an investment for the
long haul.
The use of a legal entity solves these problems by simply letting the
entity own the assets. Because the entity does not owe the investor’s personal
creditor anything, it has no obligation to make early tender of the desired
cash. The creditor can take whatever interest the debtor-investor had, but
that interest will have included a waiver of withdrawal rights. Entities can
make long-term projects safe from wasteful dissolution.
2. Priority of Claims
The second benefit of asset partitioning is prioritization of creditor
claims. By allowing the creation of legally distinct pools of assets, cordoning
off one set for only certain creditors, asset partitioning can lower the total
cost of credit for the heterogeneous community of creditors.71
To see how, consider Hansmann and Kraakman’s example of a travel-
business conglomerate.72 Some people know quite a bit about airlines but
not much about rental cars.73 They may be able to vet an airline’s prospects
cheaply, but it would be costly for them to form useful opinions about the
quality of a car-rental business. If they were forced to lend to a rental com-
pany, they would do so only at rates that incorporated their heightened risk
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Organizational Law as Asset Partitioning, 44
Eur. Econ. Rev. 807, 811 (2000).
72. Id.
73. Many scholars have stressed the importance of specialized creditors. See, e.g.,
Anthony J. Casey, The New Corporate Web: Tailored Entity Partitions and Creditors’ Selective
Enforcement, 124 Yale L.J. 2680, 2685 (2015); Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman,
Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 Yale L.J. 1143, 1159–60 (1979) (“[T]he
expected monitoring costs of some creditors are almost certain to be lower than the costs of
others, even at comparable levels of risk, and to rise more slowly in response to increases in
risk as well, because of the comparative advantage these creditors enjoy in obtaining and as-
sessing information about the debtor’s behavior.”); Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors
of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 499, 522–23 (1976); Mark B. Wessman, Purchase
Money Inventory Financing: The Case for Limited Cross-Collateralization, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 1283,
1301 n.167 (1990) (discussing creditors with “specialized knowledge of particular kinds of
assets”); David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Anatomy Lessons, 113 Yale L.J. 1519, 1566 (2004) (re-
viewing Reinier Kraakman et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and
Functional Approach (2004)) (discussing specialized monitoring abilities of creditors).
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of error and the learning costs. When a single tycoon personally runs both
an airline and rental business, she exposes all of her creditors to both sets of
risks and forces everyone to monitor everything.74
Worse yet, these business creditors must also assess the tycoon’s per-
sonal assets and liabilities (since her own mansion may someday be sold to
repay the business debts, they will want to know if it is already subject to a
mortgage). By default, all of an investor’s assets are available to all business
and personal creditors on equal terms. Yet great savings can be enjoyed if the
airline creditors get all and only the security of the airline assets and the
rental creditors get all and only the security of the rental cars—and if per-
sonal creditors could ignore and be ignored by these business creditors.
Yet a contractual solution to the problem, simply promising only certain
assets to certain creditors, is not credible. Such relative priority can be prom-
ised to them, but the promise will not bind any creditor who refuses to
waive her default rights to recover against the entire pool. While the tycoon
has strong incentives to promise to give each creditor a unique silo of recov-
ery, she has a little incentive to actually secure such partitioning since early
creditors are not able to scrutinize every later contract and since the later
creditors will offer better terms in exchange for higher priority and wider
recovery options.
Legal entities make it easy to dispense with this problem. By designating
business assets as the property of a separate legal entity, organizational law
bends the default bonding rule to recognize separate asset pools for separate
creditors—in a way that is generally not available without organizational
law.75 This approach can be repeated to further divide the business assets
into subsidiaries (e.g., Airline Co., Rental Co.) subject to the claims of dis-
tinct creditors.
It is now clear just how many problems contractual theories of the firm
must confront, and how legal entities solve many of them especially well. It
would be tempting to conclude that entities are therefore essential, but it is
best to avoid any conclusion until after first considering large enterprises
that somehow function without meaningful use of legal entities: the recipro-
cal exchanges common in insurance.
II. The Reciprocal Exchange
This Part introduces the reciprocal exchange. First, the basic structure of
the reciprocal is described. Then, this structure is given historical context.
Finally, the discussion turns to just what use reciprocals do and do not make
of entities.
74. Hansmann et al., supra note 60, at 811.
75. Id. at 812–14.
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A. Basic Structure
Reciprocal insurance exchanges, or interinsurance exchanges, are de-
scribed many ways: an unincorporated association,76 a “trust for a pur-
pose,”77 a quasi-corporation,78 and “more than a partnership and something
less than an insurance corporation.”79 One court offered the near tautology,
“This is what it is: it’s an interinsurance exchange defined by the Insurance
Code.”80
The Fifth Circuit recently reiterated the most conventional description:
“[I]n its pure form, a reciprocal insurance exchange is a web of contractual
relationships between subscribers who agree to insure one another, consum-
mated through a common agent with power of attorney.”81 This description
has been repeated, essentially unchanged, for more than one hundred
years.82
Thus, the core of the reciprocal exchange is (1) the direct linkage be-
tween insurance customers, (2) which is facilitated by a common agent. No-
where in that definition is a legal entity contemplated.
In conventional insurance, the policyholder pays a fee to an entity that
agrees to indemnify her against loss. For example, one thousand people
might each pay in $10 per year. After a fire, one individual might claim
$6,000 from the insurance company, leaving some $4,000 remaining. That
surplus can be retained from year to year or paid out to the owners of the
company—usually investors but sometimes the policyholders themselves.
In reciprocal insurance, participants sign an agreement authorizing an
agent to act as their attorney-in-fact for the purposes of insurance. That
agent then does the rest, soliciting other customers and signing contracts
among them to cross-indemnify for risk. The individual’s $6,000 claim is a
$6 claim against each and every policyholder. Customers will usually prepay
a sum (perhaps the very same $10) at the start of the year intended to meet
76. State ex rel. Auto. Club Inter-Ins. Exch. v. Gaertner, 636 S.W.2d 68, 74 (Mo. 1982).
77. David Mayers & Clifford W. Smith, On the Choice of Organizational Form: Theory
and Evidence from the Insurance Industry, in Handbook of Insurance 669, 674 (Georges
Dionne ed., 2d ed. 2013).
78. Reinmuth, supra note 7, at 182.
79. In re Minn. Ins. Underwriters, 36 F.2d 371, 372 (D. Minn. 1929).
80. Lee v. Interinsurance Exch. of the Auto. Club of S. Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 798, 804 (Ct.
App. 1996).
81. True v. Robles, 571 F.3d 412, 414 (5th Cir. 2009).
82. See Robert J. Brennen, Inter-Insurance—Its Legal Aspects and Business Possibilities, 58
Cent. L.J. 323, 323 (1904) (“By inter-insurance . . . is meant that system of insurance whereby
several individuals, partnerships and corporations underwrite each other’s risks against loss by
fire or other hazard, through an attorney in fact, common to all, under an agreement that each
underwriter acts separately and severally, not jointly with any other.”). Most states have
adopted a formulation similar to this. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 27-31-1 (2014); Del. Code Ann.
tit. 18, § 5701 (West 2015); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 175 § 94A (2014); Tex. Ins. Code Ann.
§ 942.001 (West 2009). This definition, however, is not universally accepted. See Lee, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 804 (asserting that California law rejects the notion that the subscriber is an insurer
to others).
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the maturing claims. Any unused premiums may be returned to customers
or retained to cover premiums for future years.83 Owing to their dual role as
both insured and insurer, the customers are usually called “subscribers.”84
The term “exchange” is used to refer to the physical or conceptual space in
which subscribers’ risks are swapped.85
These cross-indemnities are arranged by the policyholders’ common
agent, the attorney-in-fact. Her powers, which are set by individual contracts
with the subscribers, usually include day-to-day authority and the right to
sign policies of insurance.86 The attorney-in-fact charges a portion (ordina-
rily 15–30%) of premiums. From that sum, she pays all expenses except for
maturing insurance claims and reinsurance premiums.87
In some reciprocals, the subscribers are represented by a committee,
somewhat akin to a corporation’s board of directors.88 The character of this
body differs from state to state and company to company. In some cases, the
advisory committee has few formal powers.89 In others, it may have a mean-
ingful ability to replace the attorney-in-fact.90 The power to replace the at-
torney-in-fact is important for succession planning, especially since human
attorneys-in-fact eventually retire or die. Regardless of formal powers, some
committees are passive or controlled by the attorney-in-fact, while others are
assertive in their rights.91
In good years, there may be a substantial refund of the subscribers’ an-
nual fee.92 In bad years, however, subscribers could be called upon to make
potentially unlimited capital contributions. In early reciprocals, subscribers
were personally liable for additional payments if losses outstripped prepay-
ments.93 While this “assessment” feature was once more common in the re-
ciprocal than other business structures, it was never unique to them. Mutual
insurance companies have sometimes exposed their members to additional
83. Norgaard, supra note 7, at 31.
84. E.g., Tex. Ins. Code Ann. § 942.001(4).
85. E.g., id. § 942.001 (“ ‘Exchange’ means a reciprocal or interinsurance exchange and
includes the office through which a reciprocal or interinsurance contract is exchanged.”).
86. See, e.g., Lumbermen’s Underwriting All. v. Corcoran, 479 N.Y.S.2d 797, 798 (App.
Div. 1984).
87. See 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 74 (2013).
88. E.g., True v. Robles, 571 F.3d 412, 416 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting the reciprocal ex-
change had a board of directors which was protected by the business-judgment rule). But see
Angoff v. Cas. Indem. Exch., 963 S.W.2d 258, 262 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (“A reciprocal insur-
ance exchange typically does not have a board of directors, and CIE was no exception.”).
89. Lumbermen’s Underwriting, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
90. See, e.g., Propac-Mass, Inc. v. Comm’r of Ins., 648 N.E.2d 407, 408 (Mass. 1995).
91. Id. (noting that the attorney-in-fact and founder was terminated after four years of
service by exchange’s board of advisors).
92. Early reciprocals tended to match the premiums charged by mutuals and stock com-
panies, and then return the bulk of it when losses proved low. E.g., Norgaard, supra note 7, at
58 (noting that early lumbermen’s reciprocals returned 50–70% of deposits each year).
93. E.g., Howell v. Knox, 211 S.W.2d 324, 329 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) (commissioner as-
sessing for insolvent exchange).
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liabilities.94 Eighty percent of municipal insurance pools—related to recipro-
cals but not quite identical—also provide for assessment.95 Early unincorpo-
rated insurance companies and insurance partnerships, like all partnerships,
exposed their members to joint and several liability.96
In any case, by the early 1930s, the right of reciprocals to limit their
members’ liability was firmly established.97 By the 1960s, reciprocals ordina-
rily limited liability to one additional premium deposit or less.98 Thus, while
some have wrongly emphasized personal liability as a distinguishing feature
of reciprocals, personal liability is neither a necessary nor sufficient charac-
teristic of the reciprocal exchange.
B. History
Unincorporated insurance companies emerged in the eighteenth cen-
tury in England,99 but reciprocals are an American innovation.100 The first
reciprocal was a dry-goods warehouse insurer begun in 1881,101 and it typi-
fied the motivation for many early reciprocals. The subscribers were among
the earliest adopters of fire-control sprinklers, yet insurance companies
charged them the same rate as facilities with only obsolete loss-prevention
measures.102 In other words, they felt that they were being improperly
pooled and sought to skim their own cream at a time when insurance rates
were neither competitive nor actuarially graduated.103
94. 3 Steven Plitt et al., Couch on Insurance § 39:17 (rev. 3d ed. 2011); e.g., People
ex rel. Bolton v. Crossley, 222 N.E.2d 488 (Ill. 1966).
95. Peter C. Young, Risk Pools, in 2 Encyclopedia of Public Administration and
Public Policy 1065, 1069 (Jack Rabin ed., 2003).
96. Ron Harris, The History of Team Production Theory, 38 Seattle U. L. Rev. 537, 545
(2015) (describing unlimited liability of syndicates and unincorporated insurance companies).
97. Wysong v. Auto. Underwriters, Inc., 184 N.E. 783, 787 (Ind. 1933); see also infra
Sections III.A., III.B.
98. Lee v. Interinsurance Exch. of the Auto. Club of S. Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 798, 803 (Ct.
App. 1996) (citing Reinmuth, supra note 7, at 17–19). Oftentimes, limitations on assessment
were permitted only if the exchange maintained a large capital surplus, effectively imposing on
the reciprocal the same reserve requirement as an entity-based insurance company. Rei-
nmuth, supra note 7, at 44–45.
99. Harris, supra note 96, at 545 (“Syndicates such as the Lloyds for marine insurance—
in Lloyds Coffee Shop around 1730—and unincorporated insurance companies, such as Phoe-
nix and Equitable Life Insurance (1756) and Phoenix Fire Insurance Company (1781), were
formed. These were not corporate entities; they did not have the privilege of limitation of
liability, and they did not create a separate pool of assets from those of their investors.” (foot-
note omitted)).
100. Norgaard, supra note 7, at 3; Reinmuth, supra note 7, at xi (“[T]he reciprocal is a
distinctively American form of insurer.”). In fact, reciprocals also exist in Canada, but I am
not aware of any that provide retail coverage.
101. Reinmuth, supra note 7, at 1.
102. Id.
103. Richard L. Norgaard, What Is a Reciprocal?, 31 J. Risk & Ins. 51, 54–55 (1964)
(“[T]he underlying purpose is the lower cost to the insured through reciprocal operations as
compared to the operations of other types of insurance organizations. . . .Companies applied a
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Escape from inferior risk pools remained a motivating factor for the
other early reciprocals. Such early reciprocals included USAA, which was
founded by military officers convinced that they were better drivers than
civilians,104 and Farmers, which supposed that rural drivers were on the
whole safer than urban drivers.105
In many cases, the reciprocal form appears to have been chosen because
regulatory compliance was easy enough for noninsurance experts to navigate
as a part-time business.106 At first, no statutes specifically addressed recipro-
cals, 107 and early statutes—the first enacted in 1913108—tended to impose
different and lesser regulation than required of stock and mutual insurers.109
If the earliest reciprocals were chosen because they were easy enough for
nonprofessionals to begin, professionalized reciprocals retained that form in
part because of favorable legal treatment. In the opinion of some observers,
the growth of reciprocals was encouraged by favorable regulatory and litiga-
tion options.110As recently as the 1940s and 1950s, favorable tax status gave
reciprocals a competitive advantage.111
broad brush in setting up classes of risks; they might, for example, combine in one classifica-
tion all dwellings and all commercial buildings despite marked variations in construction and
location. Desires of insurers to correct deficiencies were lacking because the field was unlim-
ited and profits were high; furthermore, no studies had been made for the purpose of equating
premium to risk.”).
104. Paul T. Ringenbach, USAA: A Tradition of Service 1922–1997, at 20 (1997)
(discussing an advertisement that read, “It is estimated that over one-half of the losses paid by
civilian companies have been . . . due to moral turpitude, crookedness, and dishonesty. The
recognized honesty of our policy holders is our safeguard against any but actual, honest, and
unavoidable losses.” (alteration in original)).
105. Farmers Insurance Group of Companies History, Funding Universe, http://www.
fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/farmers-insurance-group-of-companies-history/
 [https://perma.cc/2LZE-FWK3].
106. See Long v. Sakleson, 195 A. 416, 418 (Pa. 1937) (“[I]ts peculiar organization lent
itself to wider development because it was beyond the scope of most regulatory and taxing
statutes dealing with insurance.”); 3 Plitt et al., supra note 94, § 39:51 (“The interinsurance
exchange was in its earlier years beyond the scope of most regulatory and taxing statutes deal-
ing with insurance companies.”).
107. In re Minn. Ins. Underwriters, 36 F.2d 371, 372 (D. Minn. 1929) (“It is a well-known
fact that reciprocal or interinsurance exchanges existed in this country prior to enactment of
laws authorizing them.”).
108. 1913 Pa. Laws 634 (repealed 1921).
109. See 3 Plitt et al., supra note 94, § 39:51 (“[R]eciprocal insurance exchanges may be
regulated in a manner different than mutual companies.”); Brennen, supra note 82, at 323
(“Insurance through incorporated companies is beset with destroying taxation and license fees
in a multitude of states, with penalties, burdens and ill-advised legislation of all kinds . . . .”).
110. Long, 195 A. at 418 (asserting that reciprocals grew because they were “beyond the
scope of most regulatory and taxing statutes dealing with insurance”).
111. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2007-01-014, at 3 (Jan. 5, 2007), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/
0701014.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8JJ-QKG2] (describing how 1962 tax legislation preserved for
reciprocals favorable tax status, which was eventually removed by the Tax Reform Act of
1986.); see also Norgaard, supra note 7, at 111 (stating that the Transport Indemnity Exchange,
which originated in California in 1945, was the first reciprocal organized to capitalize on tax
advantages; its income paid as premiums was deductible, became surplus of the reciprocal, and
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Statutory inaction or permissiveness was often secured on the basis of
philosophically contractarian rationales: with no entity involved, reciprocals
were private contracts without public significance, and not appropriately the
subject of public regulation.112 Reciprocals also deployed their nonentity sta-
tus strategically. “It is the practice of reciprocal insurance exchanges, domes-
tic or foreign, to contend, when sued in a court of law, that an exchange is
not a juristic entity.”113 Therefore, plaintiffs would be required to bring suit
against the various members of the exchange. Even if such widespread ser-
vice were practical, those defendants might then contest personal jurisdic-
tion114 or subject matter jurisdiction.115
Yet it would be wrong to conceive of reciprocals as being principally a
tool of regulatory arbitrage. For one thing, their legal advantages were only
temporary. Courts eventually bypassed philosophical questions about the
existence of an entity to impose on reciprocals similar treatment to that due
an insurance corporation.116 State legislatures likewise acted, because of both
incumbent industry protectionism and genuine concern about the risks un-
sound and unscrupulous reciprocals might pose. The federal tax advantages
for reciprocals have largely disappeared.117
Nor did reciprocals receive merely positive treatment. For example,
many states restricted operation by out-of-state reciprocals.118 Reciprocals
then was converted to stock as the exchange became a stock company, converting the income
to capital gains); cf. Hardware Underwriters & Nat’l Hardware Serv. Corp. v. United States, 65
Ct. Cl. 267 (1928) (ruling that, although reciprocals had been exempt from federal income tax
in 1926, they had not been exempted from premium taxes).
112. See, e.g., Brennen, supra note 82, at 324 (“[I]nasmuch as the business of inter-insur-
ance is so nearly done by each policy-holder himself, there is no reason why advantage should
ever be taken of him either in the matter of rates of premium or settlement of losses.”).
113. Long, 195 A. at 418.
114. Barr v. Cockrill, 275 S.W.2d 6 (Ark. 1955).
115. See Reinmuth, supra note 7, at 26. To this day, there is a split in authorities about
whether an insurance exchange can ever practically be subject to diversity jurisdiction. See
Nev. Capital Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., No. 2:12-CV-02166-APG-CWH, 2014 WL
6882342, at *2 (D. Nev. Dec. 4, 2014); Erie Ins. Exch. v. Potomac Elec. & Power Co., No. DKC
14-0435, 2014 WL 1757949, at *3 (D. Md. Apr. 29, 2014) (adopting majority position that
exchange takes the citizenship of its many members, while crediting “[d]efendant’s concerns
that a reciprocal insurance exchange like Erie is essentially shielded from ever being subject to
diversity jurisdiction”).
116. See infra Section II.C.
117. But see Kevin Moriarty, Twenty Things You’d Always Wanted to Know About Recipro-
cals (But May Not Have Thought to Ask), Star & Shield Ins. 2–3 (July 2003), https://starand-
shield.com/app/uploads/2015/10/Reciprocal.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VKY-X9U2] (asserting
that reciprocal insurance companies are uniquely positioned to avoid federal income taxation).
This benefit is particularly valued by non-profit subscribers, who are otherwise tax exempt,
and who thereby avoid all federal taxes in connection with their insurance needs. Roberto
Ceniceros, Get Flexible with Reciprocals: Arrangements Benefit Tax-Exempt Organizations, Bus.
Ins., Feb. 16, 1998, at 59; Moriarty, supra, at 1.
118. Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 322 (1943) (holding that New York
regulations that restricted out-of-state reciprocals were not barred by the Constitution); see
also Ringerbach, supra note 104, at 190–91 (noting that the UK and several American states
licensed only incorporated insurance companies to do business, thereby excluding reciprocals).
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faced legal challenges when they attempted to expand into additional lines of
insurance (e.g., a fire insurer moving into the flood insurance business) on
the theory that the different risks undermined true reciprocity.119 Although
municipalities and states now make up a substantial share of the reciprocal
business, they were previously barred from joining reciprocal exchanges. 120
There was even uncertainty about whether corporations could join an ex-
change, or whether agreeing to indemnify other corporations constituted an
ultra vires frolic beyond the corporate purpose as spelled out in their char-
ters.121 Reciprocals were barred from writing life insurance policies, a restric-
tion that remains to the present.122 As reciprocals’ early freedoms receded,
they were subsequently visited by harsher legal treatment than other forms
faced.
In the 1920s and 1930s, two other factors reduced the prevalence of
reciprocals. First, increased regulation reduced the role of reciprocals in the
1930s.123 Second, the Great Depression put stress on badly run reciprocals in
particular. The number of reciprocals halved from 1920 to 1930 and then
again between 1930 and 1935.124
From that low, reciprocals grew rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s, nearly
doubling in number by the 1960s.125After another period of decline, many
new reciprocals opened in the 1980s and early 2000s in response to a
shortage of affordable medical malpractice insurance for doctors.126 At the
same time, reciprocal exchanges proved popular as the enterprise structure
for captive risk retention.127 In short, despite intermittent periods of decline,
119. See Gentry v. Republic Underwriters, 78 S.W.2d 382, 383 (Ark. 1935) (considering
but rejecting this argument).
120. Such concerns have been eliminated by statute. See, e.g., Tex. Ins. Code Ann.
§ 942.002(b) (West 2009).
121. Duffy, supra note 14, at 52.
122. E.g., Tex. Ins. Code Ann. § 942.002(c) (“An exchange may not engage in the busi-
ness of life insurance.”). Rationales for this restriction are hard to find. Norgaard writes crypti-
cally that this was “possibly because of the problems of reciprocal surplus and organizational
pattern.” Norgaard, supra note 7, at 3. Presumably, the notion is that life insurance requires
the most stringent long-term protection of the insurance funds and reciprocals have histori-
cally had a bias towards easy subscriber withdrawal.
123. Frederick G. Crane, Book Review, 35 J. Risk & Ins. 292, 292–93 (1968) (reviewing
Reinmuth, supra note 7) (“[Reciprocals] reached their high water mark around 1925.”).
124. Norgaard, supra note 7, at 71; see also Benham v. Pryke, 744 P.2d 67, 71 (Colo. 1987)
(reporting on the closure of reciprocals).
125. Norgaard, supra note 7, at 7, 71 (“On a comparative basis reciprocals are the indus-
try’s fastest growing group.”).
126. See A. Gordon McAleer, Out of Crisis, a Proven Course Is Found, Frontiers Health
Services Mgmt., Fall 2003, at 17, 19–21. New Jersey’s largest medical malpractice insurer
converted to a reciprocal (it was a mutual from 1977 until 1999). Cinda Becker, A New Incar-
nation, Modern Healthcare, May 13, 2002, at 28.
127. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-05-536, Risk Retention Groups:
Common Regulatory Standards and Greater Member Protections Are Needed (2005),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05536.pdf [https://perma.cc/M34W-GXLK]. As of 2003, more
than 1% of all commercial insurance was provided in this way. Id.
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reciprocals were generally an important player in the insurance market
throughout the twentieth century and early 2000s.
Currently, reciprocal exchanges play a major role in insuring Americans
against fire, automobile liability, specialized business risks, and municipal
liability.128 USAA, a reciprocal insurer with a reputation for customer service
and a focus on those with ties to the armed forces, has over ten million
customers.129 Farmers Insurance has even more customers and is one of
America’s 250 largest enterprises.130 Both Farmers and USAA are among the
nation’s ten largest insurers (excluding life insurance),131 and Erie Insurance,
another Fortune 500 reciprocal, is among the top twenty.132 The scale of
reciprocal insurance makes it an important subject for inquiry, but inquiry
has been scarce.
C. Entities: Absent or Incidental
It was once possible to claim that reciprocals operated without any hint
of a legal entity. The exchange was deemed to be a place and not a person at
128. On municipality insurance, see Thomas W. Rynard, Insurance and Risk Man-
agement for State and Local Governments (2009), which profiles government insurance
options; Young, supra note 95, at 1065–66; and Jason E. Doucette, Note, Wading in the Pool:
Interlocal Cooperation in Municipal Insurance and the State Regulation of Public Entity Risk
Sharing Pools—A Survey, 8 Conn. Ins. L.J. 533, 542 (2002), which describes organizational
structures in government risk pooling.
129. Report to Members 2016: Standing Together, USAA, https://www.usaa.com/inet/wc/
reporttomembers_main_landing [https://perma.cc/CW4A-HZJA].
130. Farmers Insurance Exchange (FIE), Today Was Named Again to the List of Fortune
Magazine’s 500 Largest Companies Based in the United States, Farmers Ins. (June 6, 2016),
https://www.farmers.com/news/2016/farmers-insurance-exchange-makes-2016-fortune-500-
list/ [https://perma.cc/R8J3-5WFQ].
131. Caitlin Bronson, These Are the Top 25 Property/Casualty Insurance Companies in the
U.S., Ins. Bus. (May 31, 2016), http://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/us/news/breaking-
news/these-are-the-top-25-propertycasualty-insurance-companies-in-the-us-32630.aspx
[https://perma.cc/S4KS-ERP4]. Both USAA and Farmers are unable to provide life insurance
through their reciprocal exchanges, though both are affiliated with life insurance companies.
The attorney-in-fact for Farmers, for example, is now owned by Zurich Insurance Group,
which is the world’s second largest insurance conglomerate and writes plenty of life insurance.
Prableen Bajpai, World’s Top 10 Insurance Companies, Investopedia (Jan. 7, 2015) (updated
Mar. 23, 2016, 5:02 PM), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/010715/
worlds-top-10-insurance-companies.asp?header_alt=c [https://perma.cc/X29L-GUDW]; see
also Life Insurance, USAA, https://www.usaa.com/inet/pages/insurance_life_main [https://per
ma.cc/T2R5-7F6P].
132. Bronson, supra note 131.
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all.133 It could not sue.134 It did not pay taxes. 135 It was not entitled to volun-
tary bankruptcy proceedings available to “natural persons and artificial per-
sons.” 136 Refusing such a petition for voluntary bankruptcy filed by an
attorney-in-fact on behalf of a defunct exchange, one court explained its
decision by stressing the inability of contract alone to create a legal person:
But not every association of natural persons is an artificial, conventional,
or juristic person. (If A and B and C interchange among themselves con-
tracts of mutual insurance, an association, in the broad sense of the word,
may be said to have resulted, but certainly a new person—an artificial,
conventional, or juristic person, has not thereby been created. If instead of
three, three thousand interchange insurance contracts, still no artificial
person has been created.) It is only if an association is of such a nature as
that there results from it a new and distinct entity, recognized as such by
law, that it may be said to be an artificial, a conventional, a juristic person.
As the eminent jurist, Learned Hand, said, when he was a district judge (he
was discussing this very section): “To the creation of a person vested with
rights and bound by obligations, there is always necessary . . . some fiat of
the state.”137
Judicial temperament has since changed.138 An exchange may now be
taxed,139 sued,140 rate regulated,141 and liquidated.142 But have those incidents
133. E.g., General Revenue Revision: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means,
supra note 18, at 3342 (statement of Floyd E. Jacobs, General Counsel, American Reciprocal
Insurance Association) (“Again, we reiterate, that the so-called exchange is a mere place at
which the subscriber-policyholders exchange contracts of indemnity among themselves. Such
exchange owns nothing and is legally, of course, incapable of owning anything, since it is not
an entity.”); Norgaard, supra note 7, at 27 (“The point was that if the exchange was only a
place and not a legal entity, then it could not be regulated, taxed, sued, or liquidated . . . .” ).
134. Underwriters’ Exch. v. Indianapolis St. Ry. Co., 185 N.E. 504, 507 (Ind. 1933) (hold-
ing that subscribers, and not exchange, are the real party of interest with the power to sue);
Turner v. Henshaw, 155 N.E. 222, 226 (Ind. App. 1927) (en banc).
135. Pickering v. Alyea-Nichols Co., 21 F.2d 501, 507 (7th Cir. 1927).
136. In re Mfg. Lumbermen’s Underwriters, 18 F. Supp. 114, 124–25 (W.D. Mo. 1936).
137. Id. at 123 (omission in original) (quoting In re Tidewater Coal Exch., 274 F. 1008,
1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1921)).
138. See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 Duke L.J. 201, 240–51 (arguing
that there is no inevitable link between views of whether a firm is an entity and the subsequent
treatment of the firm).
139. Compare Alyea-Nichols, 21 F.2d at 508 (noting that exchange could not be taxed),
with Ind. Dep’t of Revenue v. Am. Underwriters, Inc., 429 N.E.2d 306, 312 (Ind. Ct. App.
1981) (noting that exchange could be taxed).
140. Long v. Sakleson, 195 A. 416, 422 (Pa. 1937); Griffith v. Associated
Emp’r’s Reciprocal, 10 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); see also Highway Ins. Underwriters v.
Reed, 221 S.W.2d 925, 926–28 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) (finding reciprocal an entity for venue
purposes).
141. See Indus. Indem. Co. v. Golden State Co., 256 P.2d 677, 680 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1953) (noting that the insurance commissioner of California determined the premium to be
excessive).
142. See Angoff v. Cas. Indem. Exch., 963 S.W.2d 258, 262 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
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of jural personhood convinced courts that there is indeed a legal person
present to be taxed, sued, regulated, and liquidated?
It is hard to find any courts willing to conclude explicitly that exchanges
actually are entities or persons.143 It would be harder still to find such cases if
reciprocals had not learned that entity characterization could help them in
certain kinds of litigation, just as nonentity characterization helped in other
disputes.144 It is far more common for courts to express agnosticism as to
whether an exchange is an entity but nevertheless opt to treat it as an entity
for certain purposes.145 This is true even where statutory language might
seem to require entity characterization.146 “At present,” Norgaard wrote in
the 1960s, “the question of entity seems to be a moot one since it has be-
come obvious that entity or not, the courts, government, and people are
going to act as if it were.”147 Legal personhood is not vital to any interesting
legal question for a sufficiently deft court, and so courts have stopped
searching for personhood—but generally they stop before they find one.
Just as with exchanges, the story for attorneys-in-fact has become more
complicated in recent years. Early reciprocals appointed only human beings
as their attorneys-in-fact. For example, the nation’s first reciprocal operated
from 1882 to 1918 through a succession of human attorneys-in-fact.148 Yet in
the 1920s, many reciprocals began installing legal entities as their attorneys-
143. E.g., W.R. Roach & Co. v. Harding, 181 N.E. 331, 336 (Ill. 1932) (finding that ex-
change has the attributes of a legal entity, in contrast to the features of an association); State ex
rel. Auto. Club Inter-Ins. Exch. v. Gaertner, 636 S.W.2d 68, 71 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (“Thus,
Missouri has, in essence, afforded entity status to an exchange sued under § 379.680 and it is
subject to suit as a jural person.”); Highway Ins. Underwriters, 221 S.W.2d at 927 (“[S]ince
it is a legal entity it may be sued in the association name.”).
144. Long v. Sakleson, one of the cases that urges entity characterization, is now cited by
reciprocals in order to frustrate derivative and class litigation. See e.g., Memorandum of Law in
Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint at 26 n.10, Erie Ins.
Exch. v. Stover, No. 1:13-cv-37 (W.D. Pa. July 21, 2013). Interposing an entity between the
plaintiff-subscriber and defendant-attorney-in-fact may strip the plaintiff of standing to sue or
create procedural barriers of the sort familiar from corporate derivative litigation.
145. E.g., Mitchell v. Pac. Greyhound Lines, 91 P.2d 176, 182 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1939)
(“We need not enter into an academic discussion as to whether a reciprocal exchange is or is
not a legal entity for all purposes.”); W.R. Roach, 181 N.E. at 336.
146. It’s clear that reciprocals ought to be deemed unincorporated associations under Cal-
ifornia law. See Cal. Corp. Code § 18035(a) (West 2014) (defining “[u]nincorporated associ-
ation” as “two or more persons joined by mutual consent for a common lawful purpose,
whether organized for profit or not”). This is a definition so broad that even bilateral contrac-
tual relations might seem to be swept in. Yet courts remain reluctant to call reciprocals entities
or to hold them to the law of entities. The transitive property simply doesn’t always work in
law. To wit, California prohibits an unincorporated association from asserting its own internal
limitations (on property transfer, etc.) on third parties unless they were on notice. Id.
§ 18035(b). Reciprocals have plainly evaded this provision—whether by the constructive no-
tice argument or preemption from the insurance code. See infra Section III.B.
147. Norgaard, supra note 7, at 26.
148. See id. at 47–53.
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in-fact.149 By the 1960s, only 11% of reciprocals had a natural person serving
as attorney-in-fact.150
With the prevalence of entities as attorneys-in-fact, it can no longer be
claimed that entities are entirely absent from reciprocal insurance. It is now
truer to say that entities are common but only incidentally present. That is
because entities perform only some enterprise functions and those functions
could be performed by humans, were performed by humans for many de-
cades, and were handed over to entities largely for uninteresting reasons.151
When asked why they opted for an entity, many reciprocal representa-
tives cited limited liability and a desire to attract investors in the attorney-in-
fact.152 Yet there was also a strong tendency to trivialize the transition to an
entity or to convert for admittedly trivial reasons.153 As Norgaard stated,
“[T]he attorney-in-fact is a device to simplify and expedite transactions and
only that. As a result, the organization of the attorney-in-fact is not overly
important; he may be an individual, partnership, or corporation.”154
For example, USAA operated until 1962 without a legal entity of any
kind, and only created one to save a trivial sum of money incurred in insur-
ance licensing.155 The United Kingdom did not license USAA to sell insur-
ance because it was a reciprocal.156 USAA was spending $70,000 annually for
technical compliance by partnering with local U.K. firms, and it finally de-
cided to incorporate an entity to save those fees.157 Similar rules required
local incorporation in Ohio, Delaware, Vermont, and New Hampshire.158 It
was only in response to these problems that USAA authorized the creation
of wholly owned subsidiary corporations to obtain insurance licenses on
their behalf.159 By that point, USAA was serving many hundreds of
149. Id. at 86. By 1918, even the very oldest reciprocal (Individual Underwriters) had
selected a juridical person, a corporation, as its third attorney-in-fact. Id. at 53–54. It is per-
haps worth noting that the rise of the entity coincided with a period of sharp decline for the
reciprocal form. The number of reciprocals halved in the 1920s and halved again in the first
five years of the 1930s. Id. at 71.
150. Id. at 176. The rest were corporations (80%) or partnerships (9%). Id.
151. Specific statutes confirm the right of corporations to act as attorney-in-fact. E.g.,
Tex. Ins. Code Ann. § 942.051(b) (West 2009).
152. Norgaard, supra note 7, at 176. These are familiar arguments for the use of a legal
entity. See supra Part I. The ability to sell interests in the attorney-in-fact provides some con-
firmation of Ayotte and Hansmann’s transferable-bundle theory, at least with respect to the
managing agent. See Ayotte & Hansmann, Legal Entities, supra note 57. Though, interestingly,
the ability of the organizational attorney-in-fact to find new owners was interpreted by Rei-
nmuth as a hallmark of exploitation, contrary to Ayotte and Hansmann’s suggestion that bun-
dled novation serves to limit exploitation. See Reinmuth, supra note 7, at 183.
153. See Norgaard, supra note 103, at 59.
154. Id.
155. Ringerbach, supra note 104, at 189–90.
156. Id. at 190.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 190.
159. Id. at 190–91.
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thousands of customers, was handling millions in premiums, and had oper-
ated internationally for twenty years.160 Reciprocals, therefore, operated on a
large scale before they utilized entities in any way.
So here is what can be said: entities are now a common part of the
operation of reciprocal insurance exchanges, just like the rest of the ad-
vanced economy. But they are not a meaningful part of reciprocals, insofar
as reciprocals can operate and have operated without entities and insofar as
entities still only encompass just a portion of the enterprise. The best way to
think of reciprocals may be as case studies, like Hansmann, Kraakman, and
Squire’s investigation of premodern enterprise forms, except from our very
recent past.161 Parts III and IV will examine what such case studies may
teach.
III. Enterprise Through Exchanges
Somehow, reciprocals can operate with little or no recourse to legal enti-
ties. Such reciprocal exchanges must therefore do without the benefits enti-
ties provide or else obtain them by other means. The exact path by which
this is achieved is the subject of Section III.A. Section III.B reviews the eco-
nomic and legal props on which that analysis rests. The short answer is that
most of the benefits of entities can be secured through agency, contract, and
insurance law, which lower transaction costs and impose a pattern of credi-
tors’ rights binding on third parties. There are economic features of recipro-
cal insurance that make it an easier domain to substitute legal techniques,
such as the ease of conceptually distinguishing between liquid portfolio as-
sets and illiquid management assets, but the case is not fully explained by
simply noting that reciprocals are insurance enterprises.
A. Transaction Costs: Agent as Nexus
Reciprocals overcome the transaction costs of coordinating numerous
individuals by using a common attorney-in-fact who can handle all the in-
termember contracting.162 While the fictive quantity of contracts remains
high, since each customer must somehow contract with each other, the
quantity of real contracting is not high, since each customer need only scru-
tinize and physically sign one contract. This one contract is inked between
the subscriber and the agent-in-fact, who is then authorized to execute the
millions of other contracts on the subscriber’s behalf. With only one mean-
ingful contract per subscriber, reciprocals have roughly the same contracting
cost as is made possible by entity-based insurance.
To see this, compare Figure 4, which depicts the number and nature of
contracts necessary for entity-based insurance, with Figure 5, which depicts
160. History, USAA, https://www.usaa.com/inet/pages/about_usaa_corporate_overview_
history [https://perma.cc/W65A-DDFK].
161. Hansmann et al., supra note 60.
162. Norgaard, supra note 103, at 59 (“[T]he attorney-in-fact is a device to simplify and
expedite transaction.”); accord Reinmuth, supra note 7, at 11.
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the contractual structure for a reciprocal insurance company. Solid lines re-
present meaningful contracts, which must be considered and signed. Dashed
lines represent legal contracts where a common agent represents both par-
ties and signs for them both. Those contracts can be executed and updated
effortlessly.
Figure 4
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Figure 5
The number of solid lines is five for both entity and reciprocal insur-
ance. The reciprocal in Figure 5 includes many more lines, but they are
mostly costless dashed lines. The attorney-in-fact represents both parties to
the transaction and can consummate the transaction without their involve-
ment. That means that the real contracting costs are the same under each
structure.
It should not be surprising that agency can serve to lower the cost of
multiple contracts.  Hansmann and Kraakman anticipated that such a struc-
ture could solve many problems of coordination and mass contracting:
It would not, in fact, be difficult to establish the basic nexus of contracts
structure, either under the civil law systems of continental Europe or under
the Anglo-American common law systems. The firm’s prospective owners
could simply appoint one or more persons to act as the owners’ common
agent in managing the firm’[s] affairs, with full authority to contract on
the owners’ behalf with respect to matters involving the firm’[s]
business.163
163. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 71, at 812. This insight has been imbedded in
other observations. As Hansmann and Kraakman write:
There are, broadly speaking, two ways to coordinate the economic activity of two or
more individuals. The first is by having those individuals contract directly with each
other on their own account. The second is by having each of those individuals enter into
a contract with a third party who undertakes the coordination through design of the
separate contracts and—most importantly—through exercise of the discretion given the
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This same agent, being the common party to all contracts, is in a good posi-
tion to update incomplete contracts on behalf of the common patrons, solv-
ing the intragroup opportunism problems. The attorney-in-fact is perfectly
able to reduce the contracting or transaction costs of coordinating a large
enterprise.
Thus, the central problem with using an agent sans entity is not the
functional one of making the business work—it is the challenge of opera-
tionalizing an efficient pattern of creditors’ rights, commonly including lim-
ited liability and entity shielding, to be discussed in the next Sections.164
B. Limited Liability: Constructive Notice When It Matters
Early reciprocals operated for decades without the strict limitations on
liability now commonly associated with legal entities. The explanation is in
part that economic features of insurance made limited liability less impor-
tant than it is in other business contexts, and in part that the importance of
owner shielding may be overstated. Nevertheless, later reciprocals were able
to achieve limited liability by bootstrapping insurance law in various ways.
1. Operating Without Limited Liability
Unlike patrons of most entity-based insurance companies, subscribers
of early reciprocals could be charged additional premiums in order to pay
higher-than-expected claims.165 Subscribers in such arrangements were for-
going the limited liability available from other insurance enterprises, taking
a risk that they could be billed far more than their stated premiums if losses
third party by those contracts. A third party that serves this coordination function is
what is commonly called a firm.
Id. at 808–09. In fact, these two ways of coordination are not mutually exclusive. It is possible
for two or more individuals to directly contract with each other through a third party author-
ized to execute those mutual covenants.
164. Human agents do die or quit, leading to succession problems. Norgaard, supra note
7, at 178 (“Where an individual is the attorney, his removal entails the cancellation of every-
one’s contract.”). But the vital contracts, among the policyholders, are personal to them and
not the attorney-in-fact, and so remain binding if the attorney-in-fact should perish. 3 Plitt
et al., supra note 94, § 44:69. As for the attorney-in-fact’s responsibilities to the exchange, a
succession plan can be approved for the follow-up agent, just as would be required to plan for
the potential passage of a large number of executives. Id. The plan might either specify the
individual to succeed the attorney-in-fact or authorize the subscribers’ committee to promptly
select a replacement. Id.
165. Id. § 39:56.
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grew larger than expected.166 Yet reciprocals grew unabated during this pe-
riod.167 For a large reciprocal able to spread the overage broadly, an individ-
ual’s share of any shortfall would likely be small, so that even risk-averse
customers might rationally accept the risk. 168 Moreover, while such addi-
tional assessments might be inconvenient ex post, they may be desirable ex
ante because they virtually guarantee payment for an insurance claimant. If
customers can be charged more later so that the claimants can get the pay-
ments they expect, customers are very likely to be paid in the event that they
ever make a claim. A rational customer might willingly risk an occasionally
higher insurance bill to altogether avoid the risk that his insurer collapses at
the same time as his warehouse. In insurance, unlimited or multiple liability
can be a feature, not a bug.169
Another circumstance made limited liability less than essential: the
dearth of nonpolicyholder creditors.170 Reciprocal exchanges conduct almost
all business through their attorneys-in-fact. Typically, the only transactions
conducted through the exchange were the receipt of payments, the disbursal
of claims money, and the purchase of reinsurance. Myriad other expenses,
such as paying clerks or securing company real estate, would be the respon-
sibility of the attorney-in-fact, and only the attorney-in-fact would be liable
if things went badly. Thus, the subscribers had little to fear from errant
liabilities to nonsubscriber creditors. The separation of management assets
from insurance assets made unlimited liability a bounded and salutary
phenomenon.
166. See Samuel P. Black & John Paul Rossi, Entrepreneurship and Innovation in
Automobile Insurance 172 (2001) (describing this difference as a factor affecting competi-
tion between reciprocals and incorporated insurance companies).
167. See Norgaard, supra note 7, at 71 (noting that the number of reciprocals quadrupled
between 1910 and 1920). This may be unsurprising to scholars who believe that the impor-
tance of limited liability has been overstated. Peter Z. Grossman, The Market for Shares of
Companies with Unlimited Liability: The Case of American Express, 24 J. Legal Stud. 63, 63
(1995); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for
Corporate Torts, 100 Yale L.J. 1879, 1890 (1991); Mark I. Weinstein, Don’t Buy Shares Without
It: Limited Liability Comes to American Express, 37 J. Legal Stud. 189, 189 (2008) [hereinafter
Weinstein, American Express]; Mark I. Weinstein, Share Price Changes the Arrival of Limited
Liability in California, 32 J. Legal Stud. 1, 1 (2003).
168. Furthermore, the risk of any shortfall could be reduced by simply maintaining a
generous capital buffer.
169. Early reciprocals sometimes capped assessments as some multiple of premiums,
rather than allowing unlimited liability. 3 Plitt et al., supra note 94, § 39:57.
170. Cf. Weinstein, American Express, supra note 167, at 194 (explaining American Ex-
press’s long operation without limited liability in part by the fact that—like any reciprocal—
AMEX operated a financial services firm with few involuntary creditors, and noting that
“[g]iven the nature of its business, in the mid-1960’s American Express would not have faced
significant tort liability”).
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2. Obtaining Limited Liability
Notwithstanding the viability of enterprise without owner shielding, the
long-term trend was toward limited liability for policyholders.171 Subscriber
agreements would authorize the attorney-in-fact only to enter into insur-
ance contracts up to some maximum amount, usually equal to the prepaid
annual premiums plus one additional payment.172 If claims exceeded that
sum, subscribers could rightly say that no authorized contract requires addi-
tional payment and that their agent lacked actual authority to incur addi-
tional obligations.173 Any governing documents for the exchange filed with
the insurance commissioner would list the same limitations.174
Courts unsurprisingly recognized the right of subscribers to set the
terms of their own obligations to one another.175 With a common agent
among them, it posed no great contracting problem for each subscriber to
waive claims above a certain point.
The more interesting transformation concerned third parties. Suppose,
for example, the attorney-in-fact should buy supplies, not in his own name,
but in the name of the exchange. The exchange subscribers may not have
authorized such behavior, but the suppliers are ignorant of both the express
limits on the agent’s actual authority and the internal limits in the sub-
scriber contracts. They may have reasonably assumed that the exchange
vested its managers with the same authority as every other type of insurance
enterprise. Can the subscribers limit their liability to such suppliers?
With legal entities the answer would be easy—managers cannot create
obligations for the shareholders, regardless of what suppliers believe or agree
to. Without legal entities, liability would be limited only if suppliers agreed
to, or at least knew of, such a limitation. It should be difficult or impossible
for intragroup agreements to impair the rights of third parties unaware of
the terms of those agreements. While actual authority may have been lim-
ited, the doctrine of apparent authority gives agents the power to bind the
principal “when a third party reasonably believes the actor has authority to
171. Lloyd’s of London, the most famous of the general category of Lloyd’s insurance
schemes, operated for hundreds of years without limited liability for its participants. They
were liable “down to their cufflinks” on any policyholder claims. Despite the relative rarity of
large losses and the comfort this system may have given to policyholders, Lloyd’s of London
has mostly switched to limited liability over the last fifteen years. See Freed from the Cufflinks,
Economist (Apr. 7, 2004), http://www.economist.com/node/2577615 [https://perma.cc/J7KP-
GWFD].
172. See, e.g., Taggart v. Wachter, Hoskins & Russell, Inc., 21 A.2d 141, 144 (Md. 1941)
(describing policies with such a clause).
173. Wysong v. Auto. Underwriters, Inc., 184 N.E. 783, 788 (Ind. 1933).
174. 3 Plitt et al., supra note 94, § 39:57.
175. In re Int’l Underwriters, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 367, 371 (W.D. Mo. 1957). But see Com-
monwealth ex rel. Schnader v. Keystone Indem. Exch., 34 Pa. D. & C. 505, 520 (1938) (finding
where statute required assessments, assessments limitation not valid). Eventually, assessment
limitations were permissible in accordance with an authorizing statute. See, e.g., Cal. Ins.
Code § 1401.5 (West 2009).
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act on behalf of the principal and that belief is traceable to the principal’s
manifestations.”176
Consistent with this reasoning, early courts indeed vindicated suppliers,
disregarded subscriber contracts and express limits on attorney-in-fact au-
thority, and imposed joint and several liability upon subscribers.177 The
longer-term trend, however, has been to allow limited liability even against
nonconsensual or unknowing third parties. This result has been achieved
through an alchemical combination of actual-authority doctrine and insur-
ance regulation: the aforementioned limits on policy assessments (and limits
on the agent’s authority to enter any other sort of contract in the principal’s
name) are to be recorded in subscriber policy agreements and attorney-in-
fact agreements. These agreements are filed with state insurance commis-
sioners. Because the agreements are part of the public record, any creditor
could have consulted them to ascertain the relevant authority and limits on
liability. It is therefore possible to treat the creditor as having been on con-
structive notice of the limitations.
Perhaps surprisingly, courts accepted this theory, under which creditors
were authors of their own ignorance, and therefore not worthy of judicial
protection.178 One clear statement of this rule, though by no means
unique,179 is as follows:
[W]e are of the opinion that third parties are held to have had notice of
and bound by the terms of the power of attorney executed by the subscrib-
ers and on file in the office of the state auditor, and that the attorney in fact
has no authority to create a liability against the subscribers beyond the
limitations of the power of attorney.180
While contractual limitations on liability and actual authority are private
and bilateral matters, they are publicly available by way of the insurance
commissioner. Insurance regulation thus provides constructive notice to all
creditors—contract and tort, alike—of the subscribers’ limited liability.
Of course, it is ridiculous to think that reasonable creditors would have
consulted these insurance records before conducting ordinary business or
before putting themselves in a position to incur a tortious injury. And yet,
176. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.03 (Am. Law Inst. 2005).
177. E.g., Sergeant v. Goldsmith Dry Goods Co., 221 S.W. 259, 261 (Tex. 1920).
178. 46A C.J.S. Insurance § 2359 (1993).
179. See, e.g., Underwriters’ Exch. v. Indianapolis St. Ry. Co., 185 N.E. 504 (Ind.
1933); Griffith v. Associated Emp’r’s Reciprocal, 10 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
180. Wysong v. Auto. Underwriters, Inc., 184 N.E. 783, 788 (Ind. 1933); see also Hill v.
Blanco Nat. Bank, 179 S.W.2d 999, 1004 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) (“[I]t seems reasonably clear to
this court that the subscribers at Republic Underwriters had no liability to an assessment for
any character of claim, including the so-called third party claims.”). It is not just courts that
accepted this reasoning. See, e.g., Ohio Att’y Gen., Opinion Letter (June 11, 1952), http://www.
ohioattorneygeneral.gov/getattachment/e10ad5ea-f3f1-4c4a-abeb-3d659c482789/1952-1499.
aspx [https://perma.cc/J8E2-7XMN] (discussing Wysong and concluding “[t]his principle of
agency appears to me to be sound and fully supported by the authorities”).
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legal fictions exist precisely to connect desirable legal conclusions with oth-
erwise unsuitable facts. Courts in fact accepted public filing to be sufficient
to create constructive notice of limitations on liability, presumably out of
special solicitude for the viability of these insurance enterprises.181
Of course, limited liability by way of notice is not unique to reciprocals.
It was used to mixed effect by English manufacturing companies prior to
general incorporation statutes: “[I]nserting the ‘Limited’ after the company’s
name, putting an indication of limited liability in the company’s stationery,
and including limited liability clauses in the company’s contracts.”182 We can
think of both organizational law and insurance law as regimes of construc-
tive notice as to the limits of agents’ actual authority.
Thus, it is not obvious that limited liability is either necessary for enter-
prise or hard to construct without entities.183
C. Entity Shielding: Lock In and Priority by Other Means
Recall that entity shielding consists of two parts: creditor priority and
liquidation protection. The former means that an enterprise’s creditors
stand higher in priority than the personal creditors of the patrons, and
higher than the business creditors of the debtor’s other enterprises. The lat-
ter, liquidation protection, means that investors in the firm—and any credi-
tors who may come to stand in their shoes—cannot readily withdraw their
funds from the enterprise.184 Because creditor priority is thought to exist
through all entities, but only some entities exhibit liquidation protection,
Hansmann, Kraakman, and Squire refer to creditor priority as “weak entity
shielding” and liquidation protection as “strong entity shielding.”185
This Section explains how reciprocals achieved both substantial creditor
prioritization and liquidation protection by way of agency law and insurance
law. Insofar as this means reciprocals enjoy strong-form entity shielding, it
would suggest that some nonentities (reciprocals) outshine some entities
(e.g., general partnerships, which enjoy only weak-form entity shielding) in
terms of benefits that only entities are supposed to exhibit.
Yet reciprocals do not identically track the entity shielding of organiza-
tional law. For one thing, reciprocals may permit a higher degree of liquida-
tion than do durable entities, such as the corporation. Where reciprocals do
not perfectly match entities, certain economic features of insurance help to
make the enterprise viable anyway.
181. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
182. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 430.
183. Nor is there anything in the forgoing to indicate whether limited liability is socially
optimal. Cf. id.
184. See supra Section I.C.
185. Hansmann et al., supra note 60, at 1337–38.
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1. Liquidation Protection
Reciprocal exchanges obtain a measure of liquidation protection with-
out recourse to traditional organizational law or entities. They also operate
in a manner that minimizes disruption owing to liquidation.
Partial liquidation occurs if a subscriber receives a return of her pre-
mium payments not yet expended by claims. Early reciprocals allowed mem-
bers to readily withdraw in just this fashion.186 Many lauded this feature of
reciprocals as useful for constraining managerial excesses.187
Nevertheless, concerns grew that excessive withdrawal could leave re-
maining members, creditors, and the public in the lurch.188 Insurance regu-
lation proved accommodating for exchanges that wished to limit liquidation
rights, tolerating or imposing limitations on subscribers and their assigns.
By the 1960s, there were “no major reciprocals in which withdrawing mem-
bers take with them all or a substantial part of their contributed surplus.”189
Most retained some portion of premiums permanently as surplus for the
benefit and protection of all members.190 Subscribers may not withdraw any
surplus if it would take the exchange below the statutory minimum surplus,
or once liquidation is ordered.191 Withdrawal before that point may be per-
mitted subject to contractually stated penalty or delay.192
186. Norgaard, supra note 7, at 32–33.
187. Reinmuth, supra note 7, at 190–92; see also Joseph A. Fields & Dogan Tirtiroglu,
Agency-Theory Implications for the Insurance Industry: A Review of the Theoretical and Empirical
Research, Q.J. Bus. & Econ., Winter 1991, at 40, 47 (identifying withdrawal of capital as one of
three discipline mechanisms); Mayers & Smith, supra note 77, at 674 (suggesting that ease of
dissolution may support control of management).
188. Norgaard, supra note 7, at 32; see also 3 Plitt et al., supra note 94, § 5:5 (“Impair-
ment of an insurer’s finances is of great concern to both the public and to the remainder of the
insurance industry, which will bear the adverse effects of any public suspicion as to the health
of insurers.”). Claim prioritization exists in part to prevent one set of creditors from external-
izing risks on to another, Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 408, and liquidation pro-
tection prevents withdrawing investors from externalizing the cost of withdrawal. Insurance
regulation likewise seeks to control externalities—with both other policyholders and the pub-
lic as the beneficiary.
189. Norgaard, supra note 7, at 32.
190. Tex. Emp’rs Ins. Ass’n v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 103 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937); Norgaard, supra note 7, at 32. Others retained surplus until a designated time, such as
the death of the policyholder. Norgaard, supra note 7, at 98 (USAA policy).
191. E.g., Cal. Ins. Code § 1374.1(b) (West 2013) (excluding reciprocal surplus claims
from priority hierarchy); accord id. § 1374.1 (“No subscriber shall have a secured or preferred
claim against any of the assets of the reciprocal or interinsurance exchange arising out of
surplus deposits. All assets, including the surplus deposits, shall be held by the reciprocal or
interinsurance exchange and made available for payment of claims of policyholders and credi-
tors of the reciprocal or interinsurance exchange in preference to any claim for withdrawal by
a subscriber.”). A related issue is the allocation of surplus among continuing members. While
reciprocals often return unused premiums as premiums, subscribers have no right to compel
allocations. Lee v. Interinsurance Exch. of the Auto. Club of S. Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 798, 802
(Ct. App. 1997).
192. E.g., Cal. Ins. Code § 1374.1(a).
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Complete liquidation is also constrained by insurance regulation. In
many states, only the commissioner of insurance can appoint a receiver to
settle the claims of a troubled insurance company. 193 In those states, credi-
tors have no private right to liquidate even an insolvent reciprocal.194 Here
again, insurance-specific rules help to secure liquidation protection in lieu of
organizational law.
Yet reciprocals were able to operate without meaningful liquidation pro-
tection for some decades, and even now enjoy less protection than provided
through many entities. This is possible because three features—two eco-
nomic and one legal—reduce the need for liquidation protection.
The first is the individual irrationality of liquidation in many cases. A
customer (or customer’s personal creditor) seeking partial liquidation is ef-
fectively asking for early termination of the insurance and a refund of the
policy member’s unused premium payment. But the insurance is often
worth the money. An insolvent policyholder may be stripped of her ware-
house by the bankruptcy court, but the new owner will probably want insur-
ance. Even if cheaper or better insurance is available, it will rarely pay to
terminate the agreement early. (Indeed, it may be more likely that the recip-
rocal will want to terminate early once a new creditor arrives, because of
adverse selection concerns.) If liquidation is rarely rational, then little effort
need be expended in protecting it. In this respect, insurance policies are
somewhat like shares in widely traded companies. If a creditor can take a
debtor’s shares and then promptly resell them, it would be irrational to ex-
pend efforts seeking liquidation. The character of the asset reduces the credi-
tor’s incentive to seek liquidation.
Second, the assets held by an insurance company tend to have little “go-
ing concern” value. The cash paid as premiums and the securities purchased
with it tend to be liquid. For even appreciable redemption requests, an in-
surance company can honor the requests without destroying surplus by sell-
ing those securities and refunding the cash.
There are, of course, limits. If nearly all policyholders withdraw, the
remaining few will be exposed to undiversified risks. But even this problem
can be rectified by again growing the pool through new customer acquisi-
tion. This is not a case involving multiyear projects with limited redeploy-
ment value, like the restaurant or factory described in Section I.C. With little
going-concern value to protect, less effort was required to protect it.195 For
193. E.g., Tex. Ins. Code Ann. § 443.005 (West 2009).
194. Frontier Inv. Corp. v. Belleville Nat’l Sav. Bank, 254 N.E.2d 295 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969);
State ex rel. Tomlinson v. Jeffrey, 107 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Ind. 1952); Whalen v. Keystone Mut. Cas.
Co., 258 S.W.2d 450, 451 (Ky. 1953); Okla. Benefit Life Ass’n v. Bird, 135 P.2d 994, 996 (Okla.
1943). See generally 1 Plitt et al., Couch on Insurance § 5.9 (rev. 3d ed. 2009).
195. Of course, Norgaard was writing at a particularly stable moment for American secur-
ities markets. It is easier now to see that volatile markets can reduce an insurance enterprise’s
assets to below its expected liabilities, or for uncertain liabilities to spike above actuarial levels.
Furthermore, insurance companies do invest in illiquid assets such as real estate. Thus, it is
certainly possible that a reciprocal insurer could be vulnerable to a “run” by withdrawing
subscribers, and that the run could be wasteful. See Daniel Schwarcz & Steven L. Schwarcz,
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this reason, Norgaard was not troubled to describe some reciprocals as “per-
petually liquidating” in response to payouts of surplus.196
Third, one reason that reciprocal assets tend to be liquid is that the
illiquid assets—leases, employment contracts, human capital—are owned by
the attorney-in-fact. As the agent’s property, such assets are unavailable to
the exchange’s policyholders and creditors.197
Of course, in the hands of a human attorney-in-fact, liquidation risk
remains. This residual risk is usually addressed at present by use of legal
entities. But even full liquidation risk at the attorney-in-fact is of only lim-
ited relevance to the reciprocal, which can just replace the attorney-in-fact
when insolvency makes it hard for them to perform.198 Just as a homeowner
cares little whether her handyman might lose his tools and truck because of
personal debts—since if he does, the homeowner can just get a different
handyman—reciprocal exchanges can and do replace troubled attorneys-in-
fact.199
2. Priority of Claims
Priority of claims means protecting the business enterprise’s creditors
from (1) the personal creditors of the patrons and (2) the business creditors
Regulating Systemic Risk in Insurance, 81 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1569, 1611, 1622 (2014) (disputing
the characterization of insurance companies as inherently stable). Still, orthodox wisdom has
been that insurance companies are more stable than other financial firms. See, e.g., Scott E.
Harrington, Capital Adequacy in Insurance and Reinsurance, in Capital Adequacy Beyond
Basel: Banking, Securities, and Insurance 87, 93 (Hal S. Scott ed., 2005). A well-run
reciprocal can do even more to protect itself by, for example, avoiding investments like real
estate that are a more appropriate investment for life insurance insurers with an expected lag
between premiums and liabilities. Reciprocals focused on property and casualty insurance
would rightly err on the side of liquid assets. At the margin, the risk of lost going-concern
value seems lower at reciprocals than other types of enterprises.
196. Norgaard, supra note 7, at 31.
197. Gabriel Rauterberg, Agency Law as Asset Partitioning, SSRN (Aug. 10, 2015), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2641646 [https://perma.cc/H6HR-NNJQ]; cf.
Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law as Fiduciary Governance Plus Asset Partitioning, in The Worlds
of the Trust 428, 434, 439 (Lionel Smith ed., 2013) (“The core function of asset partitioning
rules . . . is to separate the personal property and obligations of the organization’s insiders
from the property and obligations of the organization.”). Not all courts recognize the full
separation of assets for reciprocals. See, e.g., Troyk v. Farmers Grp., 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 589,
615–16 (Ct. App. 2009) (holding attorney-in-fact liable for debts of exchange on the theory
that the former was the latter’s agent). To the degree courts ignore the separation of exchange
and attorney-in-fact, asset partitioning is undermined. But cases like Troyk are not yet the
normal result, and even those cases tend to undermine asset partitioning in only one direc-
tion—holding the attorney-in-fact liable for the exchange’s debts, but not vice versa.
198. Recall that some kind of subscriber committee generally retains the right to cancel
the contract of the attorney-in-fact and hire a new one. Mass. Emp’r’s Ins. Exch. v. Propac-
Mass, Inc., No. CA934987G, 1993 WL 818825, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 1993). Of
course, transitions are not always easy. Propac-Mass, Inc. v. Comm’r of Ins., 648 N.E.2d 407
(Mass. 1995) (affirming the revocation of license from outgoing attorney-in-fact in recogni-
tion of the obstruction it mounted to frustrate its replacement).
199. Mass. Emp’r’s Ins. Exch., 1993 WL 818825, at *3.
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of other enterprises.200 Absent entities, claimant-customers of an insurance
company might fear that their claims will not be paid in full. In their role as
creditors of the reciprocal, continuing policyholders would fear that with-
drawing policyholders (or personal creditors of the company’s insolvent in-
vestors) would vie for some of surplus and premiums needed to satisfy their
claims. Entities allow flexible, durable property-based priority schemes by
creating distinct pools accessible only to designated creditor groups. Yet
reciprocals are able to largely reproduce a scheme of creditors’ rights with-
out entities.
In some sense, this achievement is implied by the foregoing discussion
of liquidation protection. Recall that courts have enforced restrictions on
withdrawal of premiums and surplus by policyholders and their creditors,
both out of their own desire to protect the enterprise and because of pru-
dential insurance regulation rules. Strong-form entity shielding is on display
so, a fortiori, weak-form entity shielding (priority of claims) should follow.
Yet there is still more to say.
As a general matter, insurance law automatically establishes a pattern of
creditors’ rights, privileging policyholders with valid claims over essentially
everyone else.201 New York’s insurance statute is typical:
No subscriber shall have a secured or preferred claim against any assets of
the reciprocal insurer arising out of such operating reserve, but all assets
held by such insurer shall be available for the payment of claims of policy-
holders and creditors of such reciprocal insurer in preference to any claim
for withdrawal by a subscriber as such.202
So withdrawing subscribers—the investor equivalent—are last in line be-
hind claimant policyholders and other business creditors.
Creditors of the attorney-in-fact are also generally unable to proceed
against the customer premiums held by the attorney-in-fact. This is not a
function of organizational law, because not even trust law is required to
protect policyholder premiums from the attorney-in-fact’s creditors. First,
insurance law likely already privileges policyholders’ interest in that
money.203 Second, agency law and property law are likely sufficient as well.
The assets owned by the attorney-in-fact (the trademarks, leases, trucks) are
the property of the attorney-in-fact and available for its creditors, but the
insurance premiums are not its property. Asset partitioning is achieved
without creating a new person to own the cash because the policyholders
200. Recall that if we incorporate a company to hold, say, rental car assets, creditors of a
rental car enterprise need not worry about any shareholders’ personal creditors, nor the
creditworthiness of an airline subsidiary that happens to be part of the same corporate family.
201. See State ex rel. Grimes v. Okla. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 796 P.2d 352 (Okla.
Civ. App. 1990) (noting that policyholders receive priority over secured creditors); 1 Plitt et
al., supra note 194, § 6:8.
202. N.Y. Ins. Law § 6109(c)(1) (McKinney 2016).
203. There is also a duty to transmit premiums. See 4 Plitt et al., supra note 94, § 54:5.
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don’t cease to own their cash (even once paid in) until claims are made on
it.204
Agency law recognizes the separation of principal and agent. Under sys-
tems of agency law less amenable to asset partitioning, such an arrangement
would not be possible.205 Insurance clarifies the subordinate interest the at-
torney-in-fact has in the exchange’s assets—even assets loaned to it by the
attorney-in-fact206—and the inability of agent creditors to seize prepaid pre-
miums which happen to be held by the attorney-in-fact.
Such in personam partitioning also has two independent salutary ef-
fects. First, it allows creditors of the exchange—namely, the subscribers—to
disregard risk attendant to the management of the enterprise and vice versa.
A customer of the exchange may be moderately good at evaluating the ex-
change’s policy of collecting premiums and paying claims, just as lenders to
the attorney-in-fact can focus on the efficiency and propriety of the manage-
ment offices. But a customer may not be able to determine whether the
attorney-in-fact is properly paying payroll taxes or rent, just as lenders do
not worry about overall trends in insurance claims. Second, the illiquid as-
sets held by the attorney-in-fact are often of the sort that can be used to run
more than one insurance pool. By housing them in an independent manage-
ment pool, the attorney-in-fact is able to redeploy them efficiently without
either endangering one pool at the expense of another or crafting complex
interpool contracts. Thus, Farmers operates separate exchanges for automo-
bile insurance, commercial-trucking insurance, and fire insurance.207 The
same mainframe can process claims for all three, without one of the pools
worrying about the creditworthiness of another and without paying in-
terpool usage fees. Crucial to such resource sharing is the fact that the attor-
ney-in-fact is generally not liable for the debts of the pools it oversees.208
This separation has benefits for both insurance customers and manag-
ers. By exempting the management assets from any losses associated with the
204. If some other theory is necessary, it is natural to think of the attorney-in-fact as a
bailee, rather than a trustee. An agent dispatched by a principal to spend a wallet of money in
some particular way does not take title, legal or beneficial, to the money. See id. § 54:5
(“[A]gent does not ordinarily hold the premiums received by him or her as a trustee nor as
trust funds, but merely as a debtor who owes the insurer as creditor the amount of the premi-
ums for which the agent must account.”); see also Clay v. Eagle Reciprocal Exch., 368 S.W.2d
344, 351–53 (Mo. 1963) (explaining the fiduciary requirements in the context of a reciprocal
exchange); United Benefit Fire Ins. Co. v. Earl, 181 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Neb. 1970) (“Unearned
premiums and unearned commissions held by an insurance agent are held a fiduciary capac-
ity.”); Rauterberg, supra note 197 (describing agency relationship as a form of asset
partitioning).
205. See Rauterberg, supra note 197, at 20–29.
206. See infra note 216.
207. Other examples abound. See, e.g., Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Pink, 43 N.E.2d 49
(N.Y. 1940) (showing that Lansing Warner, Inc. served as attorney-in-fact for several ex-
changes (one grocery; one canners)).
208. Auto. Underwriters, Inc. v. Comm’r, 19 B.T.A. 1160, 1161 (1930) (“The petitioner
[attorney-in-fact] is not an insurance company. It does not carry the insurance, does not issue
policies, and is not liable for losses on the policies.”).
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pool, managers may be more willing to oversee insurance to high-risk
populations.209
Insofar as there is a clear distinction between management assets (which
can be deployed across multiple projects) and nonmanagement assets
(which tend to be liquid and without going-concern value), insurance com-
panies are like investment funds. So it is unsurprising that insights from
Professor John Morley’s work on investment funds—which also stresses as-
set partitioning—might be informative here.210 For one thing, Morley de-
fends the current practice of mutual funds owning no shares in their own
management companies.211 Far from being an exploitative and inefficient
practice, Morley shows that it allows redeployment of management assets
across funds, and it simplifies work and lowers risks for both fund and man-
ager creditors.212 It also allows funds to avoid functionally investing in their
own management company, rather than whatever asset class is properly the
focus of the fund.
If this separation between management assets and insurance assets
serves an asset-partitioning purpose akin to those of investment funds, it
helps to redeem one feature about reciprocals that has bothered their critics:
that the attorney-in-fact, when an entity, is rarely owned by the exchange
and its subscribers.213 While it is possible for a reciprocal to mimic a mutual
in the hermetic closure of the system, with all premiums going to support
actual costs and the balance returning to the insureds, many reciprocals in-
stead allow revenues to flow to an attorney-in-fact, which then keeps the
money or passes it along to its investors. This has been deemed a defect.214
But it is expected and desirable on an asset-partitioning theory. If the attor-
ney-in-fact were owned by the insureds, the insureds would essentially be
insuring their agent. A bad year for the attorney-in-fact—higher-than-ex-
pected advertising costs or rent—would be a financial drag for the custom-
ers, which could potentially endanger the pool’s solvency. Whereas, under
the typical reciprocal arrangement, a reciprocal’s insureds need not worry
about the financial health of their attorney-in-fact, thus eliminating a pecu-
liar fish from the risk pool.
Can reciprocals establish a pattern of creditors’ rights without recourse
to organizational law? At some level, the answer is clearly yes. Insurance law
also creates a priority scheme favoring claimant policyholders over many
209. See Ind. Dep’t of Revenue v. Am. Underwriters, Inc., 429 N.E.2d 306, 312 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1981) (“It was conceded in oral argument . . . that the principal advantage to writing
insurance in this manner is the insulation of liability to [the attorney-in-fact] in an area of
high-risk, substandard insurance.”).
210. John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund
Structure and Regulation, 123 Yale L.J. 1228 (2014).
211. See id.
212. Id. at 1243–68. A prominent exception is Vanguard, about which Morley urges skep-
ticism. Id. at 1276–79.
213. E.g., Dennis F. Reinmuth, Managerial Control of the Reciprocal: A Regulatory Void, 34
J. Risk & Ins. 69 (1967).
214. E.g., Reinmuth, supra note 7, at 77–80.
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other business creditors. Consider an example in which a creditor loaned
$25,000 to an exchange in order to establish a guarantee fund, intending to
support the exchange in the event that claims exceeded assets.215 Such a fund
would provide little guarantee to policyholders if all creditors of the ex-
change had equal claim to it, since upon insolvency a portion of the fund
would then go right back into the hands of the creditor. This problem would
not arise if the creditor agreed to lower priority, but here, quite the opposite
promise was made. The exchange—managed, it turns out, by the creditor in
question—promised the creditor an absolute right to withdraw the money
in full.216 Absent some pattern of creditors’ rights, ordinary contract and
bankruptcy principles would have awarded the creditor a lion’s share of the
guarantee fund, to the detriment of the insureds.
Despite the terms of the agreement, and the absence of an entity to help
divide pools, the court had no difficulty in prioritizing the policyholders’
rights to the money.217 The role of the money, the structure of insurance
regulation, and the special solicitude of judges toward insurance customers
all push toward a durable priority scheme.
Although insurance regulation establishes a pattern of creditors’ rights
in favor of claimant policyholders over other creditors, it may appear less
flexible than the malleability of entity-based asset partitioning. It is a simple
matter for business conglomerates to create new subsidiaries or cross-guar-
antee existing ones to expand or restrict the domain of a particular creditor’s
recovery. Can insurance law and agency law achieve a complex and cus-
tomizable scheme of creditor priorities? There is some suggestion that they
can, by using the same bootstrapping constructive notice system discussed
in Section III.B in connection with limited liability.
To see this, consider one of the more common litigation fact patterns,
where later policyholders are promised more attractive priority than early
policyholders. In reciprocals, this commonly arises when customers assert
that the attorney-in-fact issued them a nonstandard policy and that the
terms of their policy exempted them from ever contributing extra payments.
Assessment of additional payments is essentially a negative priority position,
requiring the assessed patron to contribute (rather than recover) unless gen-
eral unsecured creditors are made whole.
Courts are generally hostile to such claims, invalidating them as “secret
arrangement[s].”218 Yet courts also give attention to constructive-notice ar-
guments.219 Each subscriber agrees to “identically the same character of con-
tracts and powers of attorney,” which is on file with the insurance
commissioner.220 If that document includes assessment risk, later creditors
215. Turner v. Henshaw, 155 N.E. 222 (Ind. App. 1927).
216. Id. at 224.
217. Id. at 227.
218. E.g., S. Ornamental Iron Works v. Morrow, 101 S.W.2d 336, 344 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937).
219. See supra Section III.B.
220. S. Ornamental Iron Works, 101 S.W.2d at 338–39.
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are held to that priority scheme. Could an approved plan of business and
creditor priority, properly filed with a public figure, establish a novel pattern
of creditors’ rights (such as solicitude to later policyholders) in circum-
stances where the competitive landscape compels such accommodations? It
seems plausible, since not all policies currently issued through one exchange
are identical, and since attorneys-in-fact can operate multiple insurance en-
terprises with different terms. If this is right, then agency law and insurance
law are capable of responsive and supple priority modification akin to the
result gained by filing incorporation documents with the secretary of state
or corporations department.
Insurance law alone establishes a plan of creditors’ rights, both through
the rigid scheme of insurance solicitude to policyholders and the potentially
flexible notice-through-filing method. Agency law further provides a mea-
sure of asset partitioning, and insurance-specific liquidation rules help to
achieve their requisite level of capital lock in.
* * *
As demonstrated above, certain economic and legal facts make recipro-
cals viable without meaningful use of legal entities. While some of these
features are not unusual, others are peculiar economic features of insurance
companies (or peculiar legal treatment rarely observed outside of insur-
ance). Those features can be summarized as follows:
Table 1
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Liability increases 
certitude of payment on 
claims. 
(a) Most insurance assets 
have no going concern 
value; (b) Most insurance 
customers will not want to 
withdraw early. 
Agency Law Attorney-in-fact can sign contracts. 
Separation and conferral 
of most liability-creating 
operations onto the 
attorney-in-fact. 
Management assets are 
owned by attorney-in-fact, 
an agent whose assets 
are not available to 
policyholder creditors. 
Insurance 
Law  
Filings suffice for 
constructive notice of 
contractual limitations. 
(a) Limits liquidation and 
withdrawal; (b) Statutory 
pattern of creditors’ rights; 
(c) Filings suffice for 
constructive notice of 
further modifications to 
priority scheme. 
In some sense, it is unsurprising that the need for entities is weaker
where unusual economic conditions reign. These economic features (clear
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divisions between liquid assets and multiply-deployable illiquid manage-
ment assets) and legal structures (the legal separateness of management
through agency law, the notification function afforded insurance filings, and
its protective channeling of claims) are not universal features of all enter-
prises. But they are not unique to insurance, and a careful study of recipro-
cals may bear fruit. The following Part goes on to develop possible further
implications.
IV. Questioning the Essentiality of Entities
Orthodox corporate law scholarship has understood organizational law
as creating entities that are uniquely capable of fulfilling certain essential
functions, but reciprocals largely obtain those functions without availing
themselves of organizational law. Logically, this allows only two possibilities:
either entities are not essential to obtain key functional benefits, or entities
are essential but reciprocals should be reimagined as entities.
Section IV.A takes the former possibility. If reciprocals show life without
entities is possible, what does that tell us about the relative contribution of
entities to commercial life, and where else might we find enterprise without
entities?
Section IV.B then takes the other horn and asks what we might learn if
we are drawn to cast reciprocals as entities, even despite the practical and
analytical problems with this recasting. Would we conclude that entity status
is ontologically essential? That is, would we learn that entities are so founda-
tionally a part of legal analysis that we cannot stray far without them?
Section IV.C then connects this discussion to one of corporate law’s
longest standing normative debates: the corporation’s role in society. Many
believe that the fact that the state grants certain privileges through the cor-
poration entails a substantial ethical and legal responsibility to society. Is
this view threatened if those privileges can be obtained without any entity?
A. Functional Essentiality
One possible conclusion from the study of reciprocals is that organiza-
tional law is not essential to providing key economic functions. Organiza-
tional law is the law that creates legal entities. 221 It clearly includes corporate
law, partnership law, LLC law, and trust law.222 And it is clearly meant to
exclude some bodies of law, such as contract and agency to which it is often
contrasted; no one has so far suggested that insurance law is a branch of
organizational law.
221. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 71, at 808 (“[W]e use the term & ‘legal entities’
to refer to organizational forms—such as the business corporation, the general partnership,
and the trust—that are established by law, and we refer to the law that creates and regulates
legal entities as ‘organizational law.’”).
222. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 416 (“While it is sometimes said that the
common-law trust lacks legal personality, in our view it is, on the contrary, quite clearly a legal
entity, and trust law is consequently a form of organizational law.”).
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Yet agency, contract, and insurance are plainly capable of substituting
for organizational law at least some of the time. Thus, we might conclude
that the contributions of organizational law, while real, are far from unique.
Entities would be denied their functional essentiality. The question would
then remain how much entities nevertheless contribute and just how much
commerce is possible without them.
1. The Scale of Functional Contribution of Entities
The fact that reciprocals existed without entities for some time is not
just a demonstration that such a thing is possible. It is an argument that the
costs of operating an entity—whether regulatory, legal, or bureaucratic—
however small, sometimes eclipse the benefits an entity provides. It is a
rough measure of the net contribution of entities if entrepreneurs forgo
them to the degree an alternative is available and salient. That they do so
may suggest that legal entities may bring greater costs or fewer benefits than
commonly thought.
Alternative interpretations are possible, of course. Recall that use of en-
tities by reciprocals has become common.223 Even if entities are not essential
for every task, they are surely helpful for many tasks. Recall also that
reciprocals have sometimes been favored with strategic advantages in litiga-
tion, and with preferential tax and regulatory status.224 It is possible that
these legal subsidies account for the creation of reciprocals, and that path
dependence accounts for their persistence even now that these subsidies have
been eliminated, such that it is unnecessary to claim that reciprocals are able
to replicate or do without entity-benefits.
Yet past subsidy or path dependence will not explain the many recipro-
cals founded in recent years.225 It is primarily new reciprocals that make such
important contributions to insuring doctors, municipalities, and specialized
business risks. Moreover, reciprocals’ past legal advantages were always
modest, and they were periodically overshadowed by hostile or discrimina-
tory legal treatment.226 Reciprocals have been restricted from entering cer-
tain lines of business in a given state or nation.227 Any legal advantages must
be tallied in light of these restrictions. If the law has conferred an overall
benefit upon reciprocals, it has surely been a modest one.
223. See supra Section III.C.
224. See supra Section II.B.
225. See, e.g., PURE Group of Insurance Companies, PURE, https://www.pureinsurance.
com/about/pure_group [https://perma.cc/5UNU-FMBH] (major property & casualty recipro-
cal founded in 2006); Michael J. Moody, 25 Years of Stability in Medical Malpractice, Rough
Notes Company, http://www.roughnotes.com/rnmagazine/2008/february08/02p068.htm
[https://perma.cc/EN2J-PKZK] (noting that New York’s second largest medical insurer is Phy-
sicians Reciprocal Insurers, a reciprocal founded in 1981).
226. See supra notes 99–117 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 118–122.
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And with a modest benefit, the overall point remains valid. The unique
benefits available through legal entities, far from being essential and compel-
ling, are sometimes small enough that even the tiniest regulatory nudge will
make entity formation undesirable. This urges caution against the most stri-
dent claims of entity essentialism.
It also opens the door to discuss other possible channels for life without
entities, where reciprocals might be used to solve problems. Consider two
channels, one within insurance and one without, where reciprocals have not
yet had any impact but might be considered.
2. Removing Entities to Accommodate Values:
Health Care Sharing Ministries
Insurance policymakers have struggled to accommodate conscientious
objectors to the Affordable Care Act. One compromise has been the integra-
tion of “health care sharing ministries” (HCSM).228 Covering almost one
million people, HCSMs are networks of individuals who contribute to a
common pool for healthcare costs, and when that pool is exhausted may
directly fund one another’s claims.229 HCSMs are controversial for their un-
certain and values-laden coverage. HCSMs impose belief-specific rules upon
members230 and withhold coverage from disapproved medical claims.231 Fur-
thermore, the amount of contribution is partially voluntary, and there is
consequently no assurance that individual claims will be paid in full.232
While users of HCSMs are obviously motivated to avoid traditional in-
surance, they may differ in the feature of insurance to which they object. In
particular, some participants may only reluctantly accept some part of the
package—perhaps the uncertainty of reimbursement for their valid claims—
228. See Benjamin Boyd, Health Care Sharing Ministries: Scam or Solution?, 26 J.L. &
Health 219 (2013); Samuel T. Grover, Religious Exemptions to the PPACA’s Health Insurance
Mandate, 37 Am. J.L. & Med. 624, 644–50 (2011); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Loopholes in the
Affordable Care Act: Regulatory Gaps and Border Crossing Techniques and How to Address Them,
5 St. Louis U. J. Health L. & Pol’y 27, 41–44 (2011).
229. Data and Statistics, Alliance Health Care Sharing Ministries, http://www.
healthcaresharing.org/about-us/data-and-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/W64K-NN7U]. Other
estimates, from the recent past, are lower. Holly Johnson, Health Care Sharing Ministries: An
Alternative to Obamacare, Pers. Cap. (Aug. 25, 2014), https://blog.personalcapital.com/finan
cial-planning-2/health-care-sharing-ministries-alternative-obamacare/ [https://perma.cc/CAX
4-XQYQ].
230. See Guidelines for Health Care Sharing, Christian Health Care Newsl. (Samaritan
Ministries, Peoria, Ill.), Feb. 2017, at 10 (requiring members to “abstain from sinful practices
such as drug abuse and sexual immorality”).
231. Id. at 31–32 (explaining that expenses related to abortion, riot-related injuries, and
ADD treatment not subject to reimbursement).
232. See Issues, Alliance Health Care Sharing Ministries, http://www.healthcare
sharing.org/issues/ [https://perma.cc/7Y4U-77GN] (stating that HCSMs “engage in voluntary
sharing and not a contractual transfer of risk”).
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because of their enthusiasm for some other feature of the exchange.233 One
motivation for joining an HCSM might be a desire to be the payer for one
another’s medical needs—to support one’s neighbors in fortune or folly—
rather than rely on handouts from a governmental or private entity. If so,
then a reciprocal form might hold promise as satisfying philosophical objec-
tions to traditional insurance without neglecting its benefits.234 This motiva-
tion is plausible for many objectors. For example, the Amish have
traditionally resisted insurance, opting instead for the direct aid of their
neighbors.
In a reciprocal, participants can think of themselves as actually helping
and being helped by their neighbors, yet on terms of quality, fairness, and
security similar to other insurance ventures. Reciprocals therefore promise a
new combination of moral and nonmoral product characteristics geared to
satisfy inframarginal users of the HCSM system, potentially expanding
choice and coverage. They might also be able to draw into the fold other
groups, like the Amish, that have long opted out of insurance coverage.235
It may seem that the use of a reciprocal structure here is a fig leaf: if
Obamacare abstainers dislike traditional insurance, they should dislike an
economically equivalent transaction in which they are merely encouraged to
regard their role as more direct and relational. Still, a key role for lawyers is
finding ways to fit important economic activity into normatively acceptable
formats without excessively altering the economic activity.236
Insuring healthcare objectors through reciprocals is consonant with the
substantial energy devoted in recent years to Sharia-compatible financial
233. Reluctant acceptance is particularly likely given the small number of HCSM options.
Only four HCSMs appear to comply with state and federal law. With only four options availa-
ble, it is unlikely that all users are satisfied with the current bundle of options.
234. See Robert L. Kidder & John A. Hostetler, Managing Ideologies: Harmony as Ideology
in Amish and Japanese Societies, 24 Law & Soc’y Rev. 895, 904 (1990); Glen O. Robinson,
Communities, 83 Va. L. Rev. 269, 329 (1997).
235. Daniel Kelly, As U.S. Struggles with Health Reform, the Amish Go Their Own Way,
NBC News (Oct. 6, 2013), http://www.nbcnews.com/health/u-s-struggles-health-reform-
amish-go-their-own-way-8C11345954 [https://perma.cc/25KR-UGAN] (describing “Amish
Exemption” from Obamacare).
236. See Brian J. Glenn, God and the Red Umbrella: The Place of Values in the Creation of
Institutions of Mutual Assistance, 10 Conn. Ins. L.J. 277, 302 (2004) (“[W]hen the Amish
explained to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) that their religious beliefs forbade them from
engaging in insurance programs, IRS agents stated that the Social Security payments were not
insurance contributions but rather a tax.”).
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products.237 Many Muslims feel that aspects of western finance—from ordi-
nary bank savings deposits,238 to life insurance policies,239 to more complex
financial instruments240—violate religious law. Ingenious lawyers have
sought to reimagine finance, from retail banking241 to project finance,242 in
order to satisfy both economic objectives and spiritual commitments. It is
no superficial contribution to offer people a product that suits both their
commercial needs and their consciences.243
3. Removing Entities to Reduce Risk: Person-to-Person Lending
Reciprocals might also serve as a foundation for non-insurance busi-
nesses. It is common now to laude as disruptive and innovative those com-
panies (e.g., Airbnb, Uber, eBay) that promise to disintermediate a realm of
commerce. For example, Prosper and LendingClub allow individuals to lend
to and borrow from one another without a need for a bank.244 Most of these
enterprises, however, really just introduce new intermediaries.245 In the case
237. It is also related to efforts to refashion insurance products to accommodate another
group that has distinct values and beliefs: the young. As Professors Tom Baker and Peter Sie-
gelman point out, adults ages 19–29 often avoid insurance because they feel that it is wasteful
to buy protection they believe that they are unlikely to use. Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman,
Tontines for the Invincibles: Enticing Low Risks into the Health-Insurance Pool with an Idea from
Insurance History and Behavioral Economics, 2010 Wis. L. Rev. 79. Baker and Siegelman pro-
pose (re)introducing insurance products that seem to reward healthy and prudent policy
members: tontines, which pay a large dividend to the healthiest members of the insurance
pool. Id. at 82. This is a reasonable effort to square the core insurance product with the dis-
tinctive non-economic outlook (rather than risk characteristics) of some under-served group.
238. See Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, “Interest” and the Paradox of Contemporary Islamic Law
and Finance, 27 Fordham Int’l L.J. 108 (2003).
239. See Hania Masud, Comment, Takaful: An Innovative Approach to Insurance and Is-
lamic Finance, 32 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 1133, 1144 (2011).
240. See Bashar H. Malkawi, Financial Derivatives in the West and in Islamic Finance: A
Comparative Approach, 128 Banking L.J. 50 (2011).
241. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Impossible, Highly Desired Islamic Bank, 5 Wm. &
Mary Bus. L. Rev. 105, 107, 136–50 (2014) (“[R]etail Islamic banking in the United States is
impossible, and yet it remains highly desired.”).
242. See Alan J. Alexander, Note, Shifting Title and Risk: Islamic Project Finance with West-
ern Partners, 32 Mich. J. Int’l L. 571 (2011).
243. Nor is values-based insurance limited to health insurance. Lemonade, a new insur-
ance venture focused on homeowners and renters insurance, organizes its insurance customers
according to their charitable ambitions—and then donates all unclaimed premiums to the
designated charity. See Lemonade, http://www.lemonade.com [https://perma.cc/H862-
UFNF]. The venture’s founders hope that insurance linked to a common cause will attract
customers and discourage frivolous or excessive claims. Lemonade considered organizing as a
reciprocal but declined to do so because of the regulatory burden of forming a new exchange
for each customer-chosen charity.
244. Verstein, supra note 31.
245. Tom C.W. Lin, Infinite Financial Intermediation, 50 Wake Forest L. Rev. 643,
657–58 (2015).
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of person-to-person (P2P) lending, the intermediary actually loans its own
money and then stands in as creditor for the debt.246
Yet it remains impractical, notwithstanding technological improvement,
for individuals to meet and contract directly. It is not efficient for millions
of microcreditors and borrowers to negotiate, document, and service small
loans. Intermediaries remain for reasons such as economies of scale. In so
doing, they continue to multiply counterparty risk and systemic complexity
because all payments pass through the intermediary. Competition ossifies as
a few intermediaries solidify their position as the solitary common party to
all contracts. Disintermediation has fallen short of its revolutionary
ambitions.
Reciprocals prove, however, that the gains from intermediaries do not
require the intermediary to interpose itself as the entity at the nexus of con-
tracts. It need not contract as a principal. The intermediary can act as attor-
ney-in-fact for multiple parties. For example, the P2P platform might act as
an agent for all borrowers and lenders, subject to a power of attorney, which
they use to sign and service many tiny credit agreements. Economically,
things would operate similarly. But legally, the intermediary’s secondary role
would be clear and they would not interpose credit risk, opacity, or com-
plexity. Even those uninspired by the rhetoric of technological dis-
intermediation should be impressed by the asset partitioning achieved by
fully separating the intermediary’s assets from those of its patrons.247 This
realization also helps to bolster the prospects for upstart P2P lending ser-
vices that actually link the lender and borrower directly, without any inter-
mediary credit risk.248
It also foreshadows the possibility of meaningful disintermediation for
myriad other businesses. While many praise companies like Airbnb or Uber
for their ability to link users and providers of services, it may seem to others
that these companies have merely substituted themselves for existing hotel-
and car-booking services.249 This view is unsurprising, and perhaps inevita-
ble, if entities are essential. But if entities are not essential, then we are free
to imagine greater disruption in housing and transportation and other in-
dustries in coming years.
246. Verstein, supra note 31, at 489.
247. See Kathryn Judge, The Future of Direct Finance: The Diverging Paths of Peer-to-Peer
Lending and Kickstarter, 50 Wake Forest L. Rev. 603, 611–12 (2015) (expressing skepticism
that technology is enough to make disintermediation feasible for P2P lending).
248. See, e.g., WeFinance Terms of Service, WeFinance, https://www.wefinance.co/terms
[https://perma.cc/KW4F-JXVS] (“WeFinance is a platform that helps organize and operate
loans between individuals. It is not a lending service or a licensed lender . . . .”).
249. See, e.g., Izabella Kaminska, Sharing Economy Disruption, Maybe Not So Disruptive?,
Fin. Times: Alphaville (July 10, 2015), https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2015/07/10/2134174/shar
ing-economy-disruption-maybe-not-so-disruptive/ [https://perma.cc/DF9C-CTJS].
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B. Ontological Essentiality
The previous Section explored consequences of questioning the func-
tional essentiality of entities in light of reciprocals. Another possibility is to
insist that reciprocals are entities, and so they pose no argument against the
status of entities. A consequence would be that “entities” are more abundant
than commonly thought, and thus “organizational law” covers more than is
commonly thought.250
There is much to recommend this approach. Organizational law fits
hand in glove with bodies of law that are not obviously “organizational,” yet
which support or supplant organizational law’s efforts, so that the analytic
distinction is far from clear. Professor Gabriel Rauterberg recently argued
that agency law’s essential contribution is organizational, establishing a pat-
tern of creditors’ rights for enterprise workers akin to what corporate law
does for investors.251 If correct, the line between organizational law and
agency cannot be so neatly drawn.
Hansmann and Kraakman contemplate that a sufficiently supple system
of security interests could allow nonentities to establish priority of claims,
and so accept that UCC Article 9 could potentially become a branch of orga-
nizational law. 252 But Article 9 is not our only law for creating security
interests. The UCC carves out numerous exceptions from its scope, leaving
tax liens, automobile loans, purchase money security interests, and countless
others.253 Presumably each of these interests is governed by some law that
borders on organizational law.
Interestingly for our purposes, one of the largest carve-outs by dollar
value concerns security interests in insurance policies.254 State law establishes
the pattern of creditors’ rights when creditors seek to foreclose on a life
insurance policy, drawing on a mix of debtor–creditor law and insurance
law.255 Priority of interest may be established under this regime, even against
250. Hansmann, Kraakman, and Squire define “legal entity” as “legally distinct pools of
assets that provide security to a fluctuating group of creditors and thus can be used to bond an
individual’s or business firm’s contracts.” Hansmann et al., supra note 60, at 1337. Nothing in
this definition limits “legal entity” to the traditional structures (e.g., LLC, partnership) pro-
duced through their associated body of law. If insurance law partitions assets into pools, usable
to bond contracts to fluctuating group of creditors, then insurance law can be said to create
entities on this account.
251. Rauterberg, supra note 197, at 7.
252. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 417–23. Security interests can serve at most
as an alternative to organizational law in forming weak-form legal entities such as partner-
ships; they cannot suffice for the construction of strong-form entities such as corporations.
Moreover, even with respect to priority of claims, security interests do not today offer an
effective substitute for organizational law.
253. Gerald T. McLaughlin, “Seek But You May Not Find”: Non-UCC Recorded, Unrecorded
and Hidden Security Interests Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 53 Fordham L.
Rev. 953, 954, 957, 961–62 (1985).
254. Andrew Verstein, Bad Policy for Good Policies: Article 9’s Insurance Exclusion, 17
Conn. Ins. L.J. 287, 289 (2010) (borrowing in the hundreds of billions of dollars).
255. Id. at 321–26.
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later creditors who did not know about prior promises of priority, if proper
notice is given to the issuing insurance company.256 Constructive notice to
other creditors is assumed, even if notice was in fact impossible,257 establish-
ing an alternative pattern of creditors rights. This non–Article 9 security
regime also provides liquidation protection. Life insurance policies have go-
ing-concern value. They can be surrendered to the insurance company for
immediate payment, but only at a severe discount.258 State law on insurance
interests limits the ability of individual creditors to liquidate policies, thus
affording a measure of liquidation protection.259
If insurance law and agency law have long been in the business of estab-
lishing patterns of creditors rights, then it should not surprise us that both
serve a similar organizational approach to supporting reciprocals. It is im-
portant for reciprocals that policyholder assets held by an agent do not be-
come the property of the agent, and that the personal liabilities of the agent
do not become the liabilities of the principal. It is likewise important for
reciprocals that insurance law require ample bonding capital, allow ex-
changes to limit withdrawal of surplus, and prioritize the claims of insur-
ance beneficiaries over others. Reciprocals provide further support for the
notion that organizational law extends into further territory than commonly
supposed.
For many, pointing out that insurance law establishes important func-
tions like asset partitioning is just to say that insurance law creates de facto
entities.260 A similar conclusion may be spurred upon hearing that they pos-
sess common incidents of entity status, such as the ability to sue or be sued.
Does it matter whether we decide reciprocals are entities or instead al-
low that they function as entities? Is there any reason to allow ourselves the
noun or nominalization of “entity” rather than the various verbs and adjec-
tives attributed to reciprocals’ customers, agents, and regulators? We could
discuss insurance and insurance regulation as well as business and the regu-
lation of business, if we wished, by simply mentioning human beings, the
activities they pursue, and the rules that govern them, rather than the legal
persons to whom they attribute the acts. Would anything be gained or lost?
There may be prudential reasons for caution before deciding that
reciprocals “are” entities. Deeming something an “entity” carries baggage
that might not be obvious at the time the label is conferred. For example,
legal entities sometimes command constitutional rights in our society.261 It
256. Id. at 310–11.
257. Id. at 315–17 (describing how insurance companies are not required to provide ready
access to encumbrance information, but that creditors are still constrictively charged with
knowledge of encumbrances).
258. Id. at 296–301, 296 n.42.
259. See id. at 304, 335–37 (discussing the argument that limitations on policy liquida-
tions protect consumers).
260. For this comment, I am grateful to Professor Mark Roe.
261. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
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might be prudent to reserve the term “entity” for the more robust applica-
tions of the term in order to avoid unanticipated consequences.262 If we can.
Yet many readers may find it conceptually challenging to conceive of
reciprocals except as entities, which is itself a revealing glimpse into the epi-
stemic structures embedded in the law and legal analysis.
It may be significant if we instinctively find entities without thinking
through the consequences. It may reveal as much about how the legal system
and legal scholars conceptualize as it does about the proper categorization of
reciprocals. Our struggle to show that entities are practically essential may
actually show them to be ontologically essential, in that we may find the
concept of “entity” to be inescapable in our analysis of legal relationships.
Ontological entity centrism means fixation with entities as the object of
regulation and legal analysis. As Professors Andrew Gold and Henry Smith
argue, private law is coordinated through “modular” structures.263 Rather
than trying to maximize some desired end (such as utility or justice), the
legal system proceeds by constructing and sustaining psychologically and
morally tractable concepts, which generally conduce to the underlying fea-
tures to be maximized.264 Smith gives examples such as the economic-loss
rule in torts—which limits recovery to property but not contracts—which
make sense in many cases and are at the same time sufficiently intuitive to
people to make them workable.265 Could the entity be such a midlevel
structure?
Taking a more skeptical stance, Professor Anita Krug has argued that
financial regulation has unduly focused on the entity rather than broader
group, affiliate, and contractual relations.266 For Krug, the entity is too small
a unit of analysis. This study of reciprocals spurs us to ask about the inverse
question—whether the entity may be too large a unit of analysis. We could
instead describe, study, and regulate the insurance transaction without tak-
ing a stand on the ontological status of the insuring actor.
Is it strange to describe commerce without recourse to entities? After all,
nonlawyers are not drawn to think in terms of boxes and triangles of entity
contracting and ownership. How many policyholders of Farmers or USAA
understand or care about the difference between their insurer and tradi-
tional entities? How much clarity does any consumer have about the legal
structure of corporate groups?267 How many business people think about
262. In another working paper, I develop the eponymous question, What is an Entity?.
263. Andrew S. Gold & Henry E. Smith, Sizing Up Private Law, SSRN 7–8, 47 (Aug. 12,
2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2821354 [https://perma.cc/2AQZ-
K68P]; see also Henry E. Smith, Modularity and Morality in the Law of Torts, 4 J. Tort L., Oct.
2011, art. 5.
264. Gold & Smith, supra note 263, at 33–35.
265. Smith, supra note 263, at 25–28.
266. Anita K. Krug, Escaping the Entity-Centrism in Financial Services Regulation, 113
Colum. L. Rev. 2039, 2041–43 (2013).
267. See generally Virginia Harper Ho, Theories of Corporate Groups: Corporate Identity
Reconceived, 42 Seton Hall L. Rev. 879 (2012).
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unincorporated divisions any differently from wholly owned subsidiaries?268
The whole notion of a legal entity is likely to seem strained in some contexts.
Much of ordinary human life is about relationships and transactions rather
than entities.
While there are many occasions for which entities are an appropriate
unit of regulation and analysis, they are not always the best option, and they
are rarely the only option. Yet, there is something about lawyers that makes
us wish to look at the entity first and foremost. There is something that
draws us to say of reciprocals that if they can sue and be sued then they must
be entities, even if the definition of an entity is contested and if popular
definitions make no reference to that feature.269
C. Normative Essentiality
For many, the normative and practical case for corporate regulation and
responsibility draws heavily upon the notion that the state empowers corpo-
rations with special privileges for which it may legitimately charge.270 For
example, if the corporation is a concession of state power, robust social re-
sponsibility may seem like a fair quid pro quo.
This position is complicated by the possibility of reciprocal insurance
enterprises without entities. Reciprocals contradict the thesis that parties re-
quire legal entities to secure certain key advantages. Insofar as state provi-
sion of advantages serves as a predicate for public oversight of corporations,
reciprocals present a challenge for concession theories of corporate and or-
ganizational law.
On the other hand, reciprocals vindicate the underlying logic of entity
essentialism by finding common foundations across all large enterprises, and
noticing that those foundations require a measure of state solicitude—for
reciprocals, in asset partitioning by way of the public law of insurance regu-
lation. Concession theorists who seek an Archimedean point at which enter-
prise leverages public law can take solace.
Yet again, worries remain for essentialist-concession theorists, even after
noting that insurance law is public law. For one, small and early reciprocals
did not rely on insurance law. The law of agency seemed like enough. While
agency law requires public enforcement too, it is a quintessential form of
private law. If use of agency law is enough to normatively and practically
ground regulation, then it is not clear what wouldn’t justify regulation.
Moreover, while insurance law provides benefits to reciprocals that help
to substitute for those embedded in entities, insurance regulation comes
with many restrictions too. It is far from obvious that insurance regulation is
268. See Iacobucci & Triantis, supra note 58, at 560–64.
269. E.g., Hansmann et al., supra note 60 (defining legal entity as “a term we use to refer
to legally distinct pools of assets that provide security to a fluctuating group of creditors and
thus can be used to bond an individual’s or business firm’s contracts”).
270. Greenfield, supra note 27, at 35.
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an all-things-considered benefit, rather than a burden with a few silver lin-
ings. Usually, insurance law’s regulations would be considered the price of
privileges, but here we conceived of insurance regulation as the privilege
itself. If the state can claim to have conferred a valuable benefit merely by
regulating, then concession theories of regulation approach tautology.271
Conclusion
Monoculture reigns. The shareholder-owned company towers over rival
forms of enterprise.272 The exception is in insurance, the Amazon rainforest
of business environments. More than anywhere else, diverse forms of life
flourish in insurance. Stockholder firms, mutuals, Lloyd’s, risk pools, securi-
tized and contractual risk claims, government provision, and reciprocals all
compete for attention and support. If the strangest entity of all, the nonen-
tity, proves elusive even there, we can hope that it is worth the chase. After
all, we know that many of the most important medicinal compounds are
discovered in the crush of diversity, so we should heed the possibility that
insurance enterprises like reciprocals have something to teach. Among other
lessons, they suggest that legal entities are not always essential to mass com-
merce given the elastic powers of insurance and agency law, though a mea-
sure of legal fiction—here, constructive notice—may still be essential.
Regardless of whether we define insurance law as part of or alternative to
organizational law, it is clear that reciprocals still seek out the desiderata of
organizational law, suggesting that the underlying insights of entity essen-
tialists remain largely valid. Transaction costs are sufficiently daunting that a
common agent is required. Limited liability—while perhaps not “essen-
tial”—is attractive enough that reciprocals almost always pursued it. Entity
shielding did strike courts and legislatures as vital to the viability of these
insurance plans. Thus, entities permit something essential and irreducible to
271. The elastic borders of the concession theory have led many to worry about its viabil-
ity. Some reject it in favor of a contractarian approach. See, e.g., William A. Klein, The Modern
Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints, 91 Yale L.J. 1521, 1525 (1982); Larry E.
Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 Md. L. Rev. 80, 82–83 (1991)
(rejecting the notion that the state is conferring privileges warranting responsibilities). Others
simply oppose or endorse regulation of firms on instrumental grounds, rather than some sort
of state-corporate contract. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of His-
tory for Corporate Law, 89 Geo. L.J. 439, 441 n.5 (2001) (“In our view the traditional debate
between concession and contract theorists is simply confused. . . . [C]orporations—whether
concessions or contracts—should be regulated when it is the public interest to do so.”). Yet
even that approach depends on a theory of essentialism because the practicability of corporate
regulation is also closely related to one’s position in the essentialism debate. If entities give
what cannot be otherwise had, then the state has substantial bargaining power to demand
what it wishes. Conversely, if all entity functions could be feasibly accomplished through con-
tract alone, then sufficiently burdensome corporate regulation may only spur a flight from the
corporate form back into contract.
272. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 271; Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman,
Reflections on the End of History for Corporate Law, in The Convergence of Corporate
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contract law, even if entities are not the only way to claim the benefits. The
fact that insurance regulation serves as a substitute for organizational law as
a sui generis regime of constructive notice does not obviate the claim that
public, property-like law is essential to mass commerce.273 The entity, how-
ever, proves a more contested subject—functionally, ontologically, and nor-
matively—than previously thought.
273. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The
Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. Legal Stud. S373 (2002) (dis-
cussing the central role of notice in establishing the contours of property regimes and the
efficiency considerations relevant to those determinations); cf. Benito Arrun˜ada, Institutional
Support of the Firm: A Theory of Business Registries, 2 J. Legal Analysis 525 (2010) (arguing
for the importance of public business contracts registries to improve the tradeoff between
secure property and ready trade).
